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NOTES
INDIGENOUS NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
I. INTRODUCTION
Robert Reich, in The Work of Nations, argues that the
notion of a national economy--distinct from the global econo-
my-is becoming outdated.' Unfortunately, in an era where
economic policy must be increasingly fashioned in global terms,
the economies of Indigenous Nations in present-day Canada
and the United States remain isolated from international com-
merce.2 These nations-once independent, now governed by a
supervising state3-in most cases cannot be said to enjoy even
1. ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 3 (1992). Reich observes that,
[a]s almost every factor of production-money, technology, factories and
equipment-moves effortlessly across borders, the very idea of an Amer-
ican economy is becoming meaningless, as are notions of an American
corporation, American capital, American products, and American technolo-
gy. A similar transformation is affecting every other nation, some faster
and more profoundly than others ....
Id. at 8.
2. The isolation of Indigenous Peoples from commerce is, of course, a global
phenomenon. See, e.g., Speakers in Commission for Social Development Highlight
Specific Needs of Marginalized Groups, U.N. Press Release SOC/4436 (Feb. 12,
1998) (reporting that Indigenous Nations are among the most economically
marginalized groups in Guatemala and noting the Guatemalan government's cur-
rent attempt to integrate "indigenous peoples into the country's economic growth.");
Progress Needed on Indigenous People's Draft Declaration, say Third Committee
Speakers, U.N. Press Release GA/SHC/3442 (Nov. 11, 1997) (reporting on the re-
marks of Marcia Muir, who described the economic marginalization of Indigenous
Nations in Papua New Guinea).
3. Indigenous Nations in present-day Canada and the United States were at
one time independent and self-governing entities. They are now, however, no lon-
ger recognized as being fully sovereign under either international or municipal
law. Their sovereignty is rather a qualified or adumbrated sovereignty that took
its shape over many years. Although indigenous national sovereignty has been
qualified, it has nevertheless persisted tenaciously over centuries. Indigenous sover-
eignty is, then, the product of two enduring historical efforts: (1) the push of
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an unhindered access to commerce within the states that sur-
round them. Indeed, the insularity of the North American
Indigenous Nations is a fundamental feature of their existence
and, too, a formidable barrier to these nations' ability to estab-
lish vibrant and diversified economies.
The history of indigenous national economies was one in
which trade alliances with European powers were established
and then displaced by the regulation of indigenous trade under
the oversight of a single state. That single-state system of
regulation-to an even greater extent than the arrangement
that preceded it-was accompanied by exorbitant and disas-
trous overreaching.
4
Given their history of economic isolation, is it feasible for
North America's Indigenous Nations to participate directly and
substantially in international trade? If these Indigenous Na-
state-administered programs to diminish the political independence of Indigenous
Nations and (2) resistance by means of indigenous efforts to maintain a political
independence in spite of efforts to force the assimilation of Indigenous Peoples. See
discussion infra Part M.A.
4. States legitimized the overreaching that characterized their dealings with
Indigenous Nations by claiming a right of discovery. Francis Prucha explains that
"as European exploration and colonization increased, a theory in regard to the
territory in America gained general acceptance" among European nations:
According to this theory, the European discoverer acquired the right of
preemption, the right to acquire title to the soil from the natives in the
area . . . . In practice . . . and eventually in theory, absolute dominion
or sovereignty over the land rested in the European nations or their
successors, leaving to the aborigines the possessory and usufructuary
rights to the land they occupied and used.
FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, 1 THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 15-16 (1984). The Cherokee.Nation questioned the
legitimacy of rights grounded in discovery in 1831 when that nation asked the
United States Supreme Court to enjoin Georgia from enforcing its laws within
Cherokee territory. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). The
Cherokee Nation denied the validity of Georgia's claim that Great Britain once
had dominion over Cherokee territory based upon a right of discovery, which do-
minion Georgia claimed for itself as the successor to Great Britain. The court
reporter summarized the Cherokee position as follows:
This right, as affecting the right of the Indian nation, the bill denies;
and asserts the whole length to which the right of discovery is claimed
to extend among European nations is to give to the first discoverer the
prior and exclusive right to purchase these lands from the Indian propri-
etors, against all other European sovereigns: to which principle the Indi-
ans have never assented; and which they deny to be a principle of the
natural law of nations, or obligatory upon them.
Id. at 2. The Court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case
as the Cherokee Nation was not a fully sovereign foreign nation, but rather a
domestic dependent nation having a qualified sovereignty. See infra Part III.B.
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tions embrace the goal of robust participation in international
trade, what obstacles would they encounter and to what extent
would they find international law to be a useful resource?
This Note examines the central role that trade played in
relations between Indigenous Nations and the European pow-
ers historically, concluding that Indigenous Nations' historic
loss of access to international trade contributed centrally to the
impoverishment of indigenous economies and to these nations'
loss of political autonomy. An obvious and reasonable policy to
pursue in order to strengthen the political autonomy and to
promote the economic viability of Indigenous Nations would be
to re-establish a robust indigenous participation in internation-
al trade. This Note contends, moreover, that intrusive state
policies-justified in terms of assimilationist ideology-were
historically, and remain today, major obstacles to indigenous
economic prosperity. Although international law undoubtably
offers a valuable resource for protecting the economic rights of
Indigenous Nations--and although the modern trend within
international law has been toward a more expansive under-
standing of human rights6-- it must be recognized that inter-
5. One promising international legal document is the United Nations Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, prepared by the Working Group
on Indigenous Populations. That declaration indicates an intent to bring Indige-
nous People as individuals, and as groups, fully within the ambit of international
human rights protections. United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples, art. 2, U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4Sub.2/1993/29, Annex I, at 50 [hereinafter Draft Declaration] (declaring that
"indigenous individuals and peoples ... are free and equal to all other individuals
and peoples in dignity and rights, and have the right to be free from any kind of
adverse discrimination"). Work on the Draft Declaration is an ongoing process, as
is an effort within the United Nations to establish a permanent forum for Indige-
nous Nations. See Commission on Human Rights to Meet at Geneva from 16
March to 24 April, U.N. Press Release HR/CN/815 (Mar. 10, 1998).
6. The aspiration to extend the purview of international human rights law to
include Indigenous Peoples reflects the modern trend in international law toward
recognition of a broad universe of human rights. For instance, international human
rights protections for individuals-beyond limited protections for civilians during
times of war and for citizens of one state present within the boundaries of anoth-
er-emerged during the aftermath of the Second World War. NEWMAN &
WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1990) (identifying international
reaction to Nazi Germany's perpetration of atrocity on a massive scale as the
origin of "[miodern international human rights law").
The trend toward protection of individuals and groups is now well estab-
lished. The Economic and Social Council's technical review of the Draft Declaration
observed that "[tihe principle of non-discrimination between individuals is a central
norm of human rights law." Technical Review of the United Nations Draft Declara-
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national legal recognition of indigenous national rights is cur-
rently limited insofar as it remains a wholly aspirational un-
dertaking. It is nevertheless abundantly clear that just as
international trade played a primordial role in the develop-
ment of an international legal system,' international trade
offers an avenue for Indigenous Nations to re-emerge as effec-
tive international actors today.
A basic starting point for any discussion of indigenous
rights is the recognition that the adumbration of indigenous
tion of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., Prov.
Agenda Item 15, at 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994I2 [hereinafter Technical Re-
view]. As the Technical Review observes, the principle of non-discrimination is ex-
pressed in several important international legal documents. These are the: U.N.
CHARTER art. 1; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 2, 7, G.A. Res.
217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th plenary mtg., U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948); Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 3, 1976) (stating that parties are to extend
to individuals respect and rights recognized in covenant); International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2, GA. Res. 2200A, Dec. 16, 1966;
and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, art. 1, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 600 U.N.T.S. 195. See Technical
Review, supra, at 7.
Human rights provisions applying to groups or to peoples can be found in
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, adopted Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969);
the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 19, adopted June
27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982)
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) (agreeing that "[aill peoples shall be equal; they
shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights."); Convention Con-
cerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989,
ILO Convention No. 169 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1990); Technical Review, su-
pra, at 6, 7.
See also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, arts. 1, 2(a), 2(c), 2(e), done Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (declaring
genocide to be "a crime under international law" [art. 1] and enumerating several
genocidal acts taken against groups, such as: "[k]illing members of the group" [art.
2 (a)]; "inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physi-
cal destruction" [art. 2(c)]; and "[florcibly transferring children of the group to
another group" [art. 2(e)]).
7. As Henkin and his co-authors describe in their casebook on international
law, international trade was one of the factors that preceded and necessitated
international law:
The several centuries that preceded the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648)
were marked in Europe by an intensification of international trade, im-
provements in navigation and military techniques, and the discovery of
many distant lands. These events stimulated the further development of
international practices and the emergence of modern conceptions of a law
of nations.
LOUIS HEKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS xx (3d ed.
1993).
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national sovereignty8 has important implications for the abili-
ty of Indigenous Nations to establish diversified, vibrant econo-
mies, including their ability to establish a substantial partici-
pation in international trade. Whereas states have an inherent
right over natural resources contained within their territo-
ries,9 Indigenous Nations may encounter formidable state-im-
posed legal barriers impeding both their access to natural
resources and their ability to introduce those resources into
commerce.
0
To understand these barriers it is necessary to examine
the laws that were set down to regulate relations between
Indigenous Nations and states. Of particular relevance to an
inquiry into indigenous national trade are those laws that
served to insulate Indigenous Nations from international com-
merce. For instance, treaties regulating state/indigenous rela-
tions often pressed the Indigenous Nations to forego some
measure of their independence and align themselves with the
treating state. These treaties frequently gave expression to this
8. International recognition of the sovereign rights of Indigenous Nations oc-
curred early in the history of the relations between modem states and Indigenous
Nations. This is clear from the many treaties the European powers and their
colonies relied on to formalize their relations with Indigenous North Americans.
See PRUCHA, supra note 4, at 17 (observing that "[i]t is in the treaties that one
sees best the acceptance by Europeans of the nationhood of the Indian groups.");
see also FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE AMBIGUOUS IROQUOIS EMPIRE 54-56 (1984) (dis-
cussing a treaty made between the Dutch and the Mahicans in 1618 and treaties
made between the Dutch and the Mohawks in 1643 and 1645); DANIEL K. RICH-
TER, THE ORDEAL OF THE LONGHOUSE: THE PEOPLES OF THE IROQUOIS LEAGUE IN
THE ERA OF EUROPEAN COLONIZATION 102 (1992) (detailing political circumstances
surrounding the Treaty of Quebec made in 1665 between the "Seneca, Cayuga,
Onondaga, and Oneida" nations and "the French and their Wyandot and Algonquin
allies"); Non-Indian Biographies, in 4 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS:
HISTORY OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS 628 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed., 1988) (ob-
serving that the governor of Louisiana signed the Treaty of Nogales in 1793 giving
formal sanction to various agreements established between Spain and "the Creeks,
Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Alabamas.").
Recent efforts to expand rights associated with indigenous national sover-
eignty are reflected in the Draft Declaration, supra note 5, preamble, at 50 (recog-
nizing inter alia, the right of Indigenous Peoples "freely to determine their rela-
tionships with states in a spirit of coexistence, mutual benefit and full respect").
Such efforts reflect what Richard Falk referred to as "the aspiration for a special
regime expressing the rights of indigenous peoples." Richard Falk, The Rights of
Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples), in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 31 (James
Crawford ed., 1988).
9. This inherent right was, for instance, recognized in the North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf Cases, [F.R.G. v. Den.; F.G.R. v. Neth.], 1969 I.C.J. 3, 22.
10. See infra Part IV.A.
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circumstance in provisions under which the indigenous party
or parties would "accept the protection" of the state party. This
was the case in a peace treaty made between the Onondaga
Nation and France in 1666.11
Based on an examination of these laws, two important
periods in the interrelations between North American Indige-
nous Nations and states can be identified: (1) the early emer-
gence of treaty-based relations between states and Indigenous
Nations in North America; 2 and (2) a subsequent, more gen-
eral and more complete isolation of North American Indige-
nous Nations from trade following the consolidation of territory
under the United States and England following the War of
11. Treaty of Peace between France and the Iroquois Indians of the Nation of
Onnontague, Dec. 13, 1666, 9 Consol. T.S. 365, 367 (providing for peace among
Indigenous Nations under protection of France). See also Treaty of Peace and Alli-
ance between Spain and the Choctaw and Chickasaw, May 10, 1793, 52 Consol.
T.S. 31 (extending the protection of Spain to Choctaw nation and renewing exist-
ing relations with Chickasaw nation); Treaty of Peace and Alliance between Spain
and the Cherokee [and other nations], May 10, 1793, 52 Consol. T.S. 177 (the
Treaty of Nogales, extending protection of Spain to the Cherokee Nation, renewing
similar agreements with other Indigenous Nations and authorizing Spain to medi-
ate the fixing of boundaries between indigenous parties and the United States).
States also relied on the treaty as a basic tool for shaping their relations with
Indigenous Nations in Africa during the 19th century. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace
and Commerce between France and the Brakna and Dimar Tribes, June 18, 1858,
119 Consol. T.S. 138-39 (re-establishing commercial relations for exporting rubber,
recognizing Dimar as a new independent state and extending protection of France
to Dimar); Provisional Agreement between Great Britain and the King and Chiefs
of Katanu, Sept. 24, 1879, 155 Consol. T.S. 274 (extending protection of crown
provisionally to territory of Katanu, providing for the collection of reasonable dues
by the king and chiefs of that territory, and prohibiting said king and chiefs from
entering "into negotiations with any Foreign State except under the express per-
mission of Her Majesty's Government.").
12. A first step in the isolation of Indigenous Nations from trade was typically
the insistence by states that Indigenous Nations sever any relations they may
have had with competing states. Where this insistence was successful, Indigenous
Nations were isolated from the global community and prevented from negotiating
competitive economic arrangements. Chief Justice John Marshall described this
practice of states and the impact it had on indigenous national sovereignty as fol-
lows:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the un-
disputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them
from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discov-
erer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a restric-
tion which those European potentates imposed on themselves as well as
on the Indians.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
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1812.8
Characteristic of the first period were treaties containing
provisions that specifically restricted indigenous national
trade. 14 A peace treaty between the Seneca Nation and Eng-
land illustrates this with its requirement that the Seneca Na-
tion "immediately stop all intercourse between any of their
people and those of the Shawanese and Delawares, or other
[of] his majesty's ennemies, whom they are to treat as common
ennemies, and to assist his majesty's arms in bringing them to
proper punishment .... ."
The historical relations between states and Indigenous
Nations in North America contribute importantly to our under-
standing of indigenous national affairs. These relations were
formed during periods of intense international competition for
resources 6 followed by the consolidation of indigenous rela-
13. See infra Part 1II.A.
14. A state practice that accompanied the imposition of specific restrictions on
indigenous national trade-and that also served to isolate the Indigenous Nations
from the international community-was the practice of compelling Indigenous Na-
tions to make substantial and repeated land cessions. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace
between France and the Iroquois Indians of the Nation of Tsonnotssan, May 22,
1666, 9 Consol. T.S. 165 (peace and protection of France in return for land ces-
sions); Treaty of Peace between France and the Iroquois Indians of the Nation of
Ouneisst, July 12, 1666, 9 Consol. T.S. 211 (same). A consequence of that practice
was, invariably, a precipitous decline in indigenous access to the basic resources
necessary to sustain even a limited participation in trade.
15. Preliminary Articles of Peace, Friendship and Alliance between Great Brit-
ain and the Seneca, Apr. 3, 1764, 42 Consol. T.S. 499, 501. See also Treaty of
Alliance and Commerce between Great Britain and the Cherokee North American
Indians, Sept. 20(?30) [sic], 1730, 33 Consol. T.S. 279, 281 (providing that "the
Cherrokees nation shall not suffer any of its people to traffic with any other white
men besides the English.").
16. Stephen Cornell discusses the importance that North America had for the
"European powers" in their "competition . . . for economic and political dominance
in the rapidly expanding world economy of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eigh-
teenth centuries:"
North America, with its apparently abundant resources, became a central
arena of European competition, and the new colonies the loci of extensive
commercial enterprise directed at control of those resources and their
export to Europe. At stake were money metals as well as whatever other
minerals that might be found, timber, fish, agricultural produce, and
animal hides or furs. These last are of particular interest here. For a
substantial part of the colonial period, competition among the European
powers in North America, and particularly between England and France,
was centered on the fur trade. At the center of that trade were the Indi-
an nations.
STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERCAN INDIAN POLITICAL RE-
BROOK. J. 1NT'L L. [Vol. XXIV:1
tions under the general supervision of a single state. This basic
pattern of competition and consolidation is not unique in world
history and was repeated, for instance, in Africa. For this rea-
son, North America provides us with a comparative framework
to understand state/indigenous relations throughout the world.
Furthermore, influential laws were established to regulate
state/indigenous relations in North America; laws which ulti-
mately compromised the independence of Indigenous Nations
and reconstructed their political status.' The reconstruction
of indigenous sovereignty became an established feature of
state expansion in North America and subsequently came to be
embraced by the international community-particularly by the
British Commonwealth countries-as a model for indigenous
national sovereignty. 8 An understanding of the events which
took place in North America is indispensable to an informed
discussion of the rights of Indigenous Peoples throughout the
world. 9
SURGENCE 15-16 (1988).
17. See infra Part HI.B.
18. Getches and Wilkinson observed that "[m]uch of the legal attention" given
to Indigenous Peoples, "in other nations has occurred in British Commonwealth
countries." See DAVID H. GETCHES & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 847 (2d ed. 1986). These authors, experts on laws
pertaining to Indigenous Peoples in the United States, noted that "[tihe law relat-
ing to indigenous people has only begun to develop in most other countries." Id.
Scholars have been increasingly concerned with the international dimensions of
indigenous national sovereignty. This is illustrated, in fact, in the editions of the
casebook that Getches, Wilkinson and their co-authors have assembled: the finit
edition having no substantial mention of law outside the United States, the second
edition having a section in a chapter on "The Frontiers of Indian Law" entitled
"Native Law in Other Nations" and the third edition having a chapter entitled
".Comparative and International Legal Perspectives on Indigenous Peoples' Rights."
GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1st ed. 1979);
GETCHES & WILKINSON, supra, at 847-73; GETCHEs ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 973-1047 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter GETCHES ET AL. (3d
ed.)].
19. The importance of understanding the particular history and circumstances
of Indigenous Peoples is emphasized, for instance, by human rights advocates who
call for legal protections that specifically address the demands of Indigenous Peo-
ples. As Richard Falk points out, these advocates acknowledge:
the impact of past experience, in particular the appreciation that to grant
mere autonomy to indigenous people, or to assure their participation in
the dominant society on the basis of equality and non-discrimination is
insufficient. That is, there is a special set of demands and grievances
that cannot be easily understood, much less accommodated, by existing
international law rules, procedures, and structures for ascertaining and
protecting human rights. The present international framework does not
246
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Part II of this Note clarifies the distinction between states
and Indigenous Nations by identifying a political and interna-
tional legal dynamic in the historical relations between the
two. State expansion was accompanied by efforts to establish
exclusive political and economic relations with Indigenous
Nations. These efforts were expressed, for example, in laws
that restricted indigenous trade and curtailed indigenous par-
ticipation in the international economy. The current interna-
tional political status of Indigenous Nations as self-governing
entities lacking the right to conduct foreign relations2 reflects
give access to the main political arenas to the representatives of indige-
nous people themselves, nor does it seem to deal with their specific his-
toric identity, their special claims, nor with their special value to human
society as a whole.
Falk, supra note 8, at 31.
20. The status of Indigenous Nations as autonomous political communities that
lack a recognized capacity to conduct foreign relations is reflected, for instance, in
documents connected with the recent United Nations efforts to establish a frame-
work for the protection of indigenous national interests. In these documents "indig-
enous people" are distinguished from "Governments." Persons involved in these ef-
forts do recognize a need for Indigenous Nations to have a voice within the inter-
national community, but not necessarily too loud of a voice. See, e.g., Programme
of Activities of the International Decade of the World's Indigenous People: Imple-
mentation of the Programme of Activities for the Decade [hereinafter Implementa-
tion of the Programme], U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 50, at 4, U.N. Doc.
A151/499 (1996) (observing the priority the High Commissioner for Human Rights
has given to "promoting and ensuring an ongoing dialogue between Governments
and indigenous people.").
Because Indigenous Nations are not Governments for United Nations pur-
poses, their participation in its endeavors is very limited. Members of organiza-
tions seeking to protect indigenous national interests may nevertheless serve as
experts on indigenous affairs and may, in some instances, enjoy a consultative
status. Article 71 of the United Nations Charter, for instance, provides that the
"Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation
with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its
competence." U.N. CHARTER- art. 71. Additionally, the goal of creating a "perma-
nent forum for indigenous people in the United Nations system" has been set.
Implementation of the Programme, supra, at 5. However, it is not yet clear at
what level within the system the forum will be established. See id. at 6. See also
Programme of Activities of the International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peo-
ple: Procedures and Programmes Within the United Nations Concerning Indigenous
People, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 107, U.N. Doc. A/51/493 (1996) (stating that
"[t]hirteen indigenous peoples' organizations have consultative status with the Eco-
nomic and Social Council," five in "the United States . . . four in Canada, two in
Australia, one in Finland and one in Peru."). For an overview of avenues available
for indigenous participation in the United Nations see id. at 6-10. Notwithstanding
the indirect participation of Indigenous Peoples' organizations as consultants,
"[many participants" at a workshop on the permanent forum concluded that "there
are virtually no mechanisms within the United Nations systems which give indig-
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this political and economic isolation.
Part III describes the trade relations that were formed
between states and Indigenous Nations in North America. Two
periods of trade relations are identified and discussed: (1) a
period prior to the conclusion of the War of 1812 characterized
by a rivalry among states for the allegiance of Indigenous Na-
tions; and (2) a subsequent period characterized by the estab-
lishment of single-state monopolies over trade with Indigenous
Nations. Each period yielded a body of laws that reflected the
political and economic relations between states and Indigenous
Nations. Part III also discusses the Berlin Africa Conference2
and the attempt of states there to use trade laws to control
international competition for resources in West Africa and
concomitantly "protect" the interests of Indigenous Nations. A
comparison of these early laws with current efforts to protect
Indigenous Peoples reveals a continuity: current international
rights protections reflect the economic relations that unfolded
between states and Indigenous Nations historically.
Part IV examines the current state of indigenous national
participation in trade, pointing to two prominent examples of
state-imposed barriers to indigenous commerce. These barriers
invariably involve the subordination of indigenous national
enous peoples an opportunity to take part in decision-making." Indigenous Issues:
Report of the Second Workshop on a Permanent Forum for Indigenous People with-
in the United Nations System held in Accordance with Commission on Human
Rights Resolution 1997/30, Hum. Rts. Comm., 54th Sess. Prov. Agenda Item 23,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/11 (1997) [hereinafter Report of the Second Workshop].
21. The Berlin Conference, as one scholar describes it, created an international
legal framework whereby European states could regulate their competition to ac-
quire territory in Africa:
The partition of Africa, it should be emphasized, was not only a scramble
for territories by European powers but was also a joint takeover based
on an international agreement made at the Berlin Conference (1884-5)
which established basic rules of partition intended to prevent conflict be-
tween these powers. And it succeeded by and large. Therefore, while the
conference itself did not partition Africa it did institutionalize the process
in the aim of creating a pax Europaea in the continent. European states
occupied territories by signing bilateral treaties with African rulers in
accordance with rules set down by the conference. It should be
emphasised that these rules concerned only relations of the European
powers inter se and did not apply to African rulers who were not present
at the Berlin Conference and were excluded entirely from this sovereignty
game. Their exclusive role was to sign a treaty. If they refused they
could be forced in accordance with international law.
ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
THE THIRD WORLD 69-70 (1990).
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interests to state or to nonindigenous commercial interests.
One such example is the principle in Canadian decisional law
that selectively recognizes a right to fish for food-while up-
holding statutes prohibiting the sale of fish-and thereby effec-
tively subordinating the interests of Indigenous Nations to that
of the fishing industry.22 A second example is the principle
derived from judicial decisions in the United States that allows
state governments, on a case-by-case basis, to tax economic
activities occurring on tribal territories and thereby subverts
the sovereignty of Indigenous Nations in that country.'
A conclusion that follows readily from the historic isolation
of Indigenous Nations from trade, as well as from the current
tendency of decision-makers to subordinate indigenous inter-
ests to state or to nonindigenous commercial interests, is that
the economic rights of Indigenous Nations must be based-at
least in large part-on a policy of encouraging a robust indige-
nous national participation in international trade. Moreover, in
light of the United Nations General Assembly guidelines for
drafting human rights instruments-which call for provisions
"sufficiently precise to give rise to identifiable and practicable
rights and obligations -- a reasonable way for international
fora to proceed would be to identify particular state barriers to
indigenous participation in international trade and draft spe-
cific provisions removing them. In such a manner, for example,
state taxation of economic activity occurring on indigenous
territories could be identified and proscribed. Similarly, indige-
nous rights to subsistence could be elevated to a more substan-
tial economic right. In light of the history of state/indigenous
national relations it is reasonable to conclude that the broad
goal of increased indigenous participation in international
trade is imperative if the international legal rights of Indige-
nous Nations are to be more than mere exhortations.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See Setting International Standards in the Field of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 41/120, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 97th plenary mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/41/150, at
2 (1986).
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II. DEFINITIONAL MATTERS: WHAT ARE STATES? WHAT ARE
INDIGENOUS NATIONS?
A. Indigenous Nations as Political Enclaves Within a World
Dominated by States
Indigenous Peoples live in a world made small by the
actions of states. As modern states expanded their influence
throughout the globe, indigenous possession of territory was
reduced,' indigenous access to natural resources was limit-
ed,2" widespread loss of life was incurred,27 and the opportu-
nity for Indigenous Nations to participate in international
25. Exacerbating the loss of access to resources that accompanied reductions
in acreage were the numerous relocations of Indigenous Peoples to areas that were
often only marginally economically viable or that were not economically viable at
all.
26. Possession of territory and access to natural resources are closely related
considerations. Many treaties for the cession of land held by an Indigenous Nation
reserved property rights in the ceded territory. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace and Alli-
ance between Great Britain and the American Indian Tribes of Virginia, May 29,
1677, 14 Consol. T.S. 257, 258-59 (Indigenous Nations to cede land and give up
independence to crown in return for assurances of sufficient land for cultivation
and extra-territorial fishing and oystering rights). As Felix Cohen observed, such
provisions were intended to make land cessions seem less severe:
By way of softening the shock of land cession, the Indian tribes were
often guaranteed special rights in ceded lands, such as the exclusive
right of taking fish in streams bordering on the reservation ... or to
hunt on lands ceded to the United States... or to hunt and make
sugar on ceded lands.
FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 44 (citing Treaty of June 11,
1855, Nez Perce-U.S., art. 3, 12 Stat. 957; Treaty of June 6, 1820, Chippeway-
U.S., art. 3, 7 Stat. 206; Treaty of Sept. 29, 1817, Wyandots and others-U.S., art.
7, 7 Stat. 49). See also id. at 336 (discussing Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556
(1916) wherein it was held that these treaty-based rights were property rights and
not sovereign rights).These treaty provisions have given rise to bitter controversies concerning
the conflicting rights of tribal members and state citizens to harvest natural re-
sources. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343, affd 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975) (construing language in the Treaty of Medicine Creek,
Dec. 26, 1854, Muckleshoot, Nisqually, Puyallup and Sqauxin Island Nations-U.S.
10 Stat. 1132, whereby the "right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed
grounds" was "secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the territo-
ry" to mean that the "opportunity to take fish" would be shared equally).
. 27. For a detailed study of the impact of epidemics, warfare, and various
other catastrophes on North American Indigenous Peoples see RUSSELL THORNTON,
AMERICAN INDIAN HOLOCAUST AND SURVIVAL: A POPULATION HISTORY SINCE 1492
(1987). Thornton concludes that Native American populations in Alaska, Canada
and the United States declined precipitously until the 20th century and then be-
gan to recover. See id. at 159, 242, 243.
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trade was eventually curtailed." In recent years, as interna-
tional organizations have devoted increased attention to indig-
enous rights,29 the question of how to widen the world of In-
digenous Nations-of how to expand relations between Indige-
nous Nations and the international community-has arisen. 
International cooperation to ensure that Indigenous Nations
can trade vigorously in the global marketplace presents one
possibility for flexibly and effectively pursuing a broad expan-
sion of the relations between Indigenous Peoples and the rest
of the world."'
The documents and literature of international law distin-
guish Indigenous Peoples from other entities, such as states or
ethnic minorities, with reference to varying clusters of cultural
and historical features. In discussing attempts to define "indig-
enous peoples," for instance, one scholar juxtaposed four
definitional "elements" that the Independent Commission on
28. See infra Part uI.B.
29. See, e.g., Draft Declaration, supra note 5.
30. One straightforward method of broadening the international relations of
Indigenous Nations has been to include organizations composed of indigenous na-
tional representatives in international fora. Currently there is interest in creating
a permanent forum for Indigenous Peoples within the United Nations system. See
Commission On Human Rights, Indigenous Issues: Report of the Second Workshop
on a Permanent Forum for Indigenous People within the United Nations System
held in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1997/30, U.N.
ESCOR, 54th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 23, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/l1 (1997). Addi-
tionally, the Arctic Council has included three such organizations-the Inuit Cir-
cumpolar Conference, the Saami Council and the Association of the Indigenous
Minorities of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation-as
permanent participants at inception and made provision for permanent participa-
tion by "other Arctic organizations of indigenous peoples, with majority Arctic
indigenous constituency, representing: (a) a single indigenous people resident in
more than one Arctic state; or (b) more than one Arctic indigenous people resident
in a single Arctic state." See Canada-Denmark-Finland-Iceland-Norway-Russian
Federation-Sweden-United States Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic
Council, Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1382, 1387 (1996). See also United Nations
Fourth World Conference on Women: Declaration and Platform for Action, Sept.
15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 401, 453 (1996) (calling for United Nations to "encourage the
participation of indigenous women in the working group elaborating the draft dec-
laration.").
31. Fuller participation in international trade would, for instance, be consis-
tent with goals expressed in the Draft Declaration. See, e.g., Draft Declaration,
supra note 5, art. 4 (right of Indigenous Peoples to "maintain and strengthen their
distinct political, economic, social and cultural characteristics"); id. art. 35 (right of
Indigenous Peoples to "maintain and develop contacts, relations and cooperation,
including activities for spiritual, cultural, political, economic and social purposes,
with other peoples across borders").
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International Humanitarian Issues (Independent Commission)
relies on---"(1) pre-existence; (2) non-dominance; (3) cultural
difference; and (4) self-identification as indigenous"--against
five identifying "characteristics" used by the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank):
(1) close attachment to ancestral territories and natural re-
sources; (2) self-identification and identification by others as
members of a distinct cultural group; (3) possession of an
indigenous language, which is often distinct from a national
language; (4) presence of customary social or political insti-
tutions; and (5) subsistence-oriented production systems.32
The Independent Commission's element of pre-existence and
the World Bank's characteristic of customary institutions point
to a central feature of indigenous national existence: they exist
in spite of the fact that states have surrounded them and have
attempted to absorb them; they occupy-in both a political and
a territorial sense-lacunae left in the wake of state forma-
tion.33
Modern states emerged historically as methods were de-
vised to administrate broad expanses of territory centrally. As
these methods were refined, the territories of the emergent
states increased. As Giannfranco Poggi points out:
Typically, a state's territory is continuous, has no enclaves,
32. Robert K. Hitchcock, International Human Rights, the Environment, and
Indigenous Peoples, 5 COLO. J. INTL ENVTL. L. & POLY 1, 1 (1994). These defini-
tions depart from older ones that focused on an assumed primitive character that
Indigenous Peoples were assumed to possess. See, e.g., Convention Concerning the
Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Popula-
tions in Independent Countries, adopted [by the International Labour Organization]
June 26, 1957, art. 1, § 1(a), 328 U.N.T.S. 247 (applying the convention's provi-
sions to "members of tribal or semi-tribal populations in independent countries
whose social and economic conditions are at a less advanced stage than the stage
reached by other sections of the national community.").
33. Alpheus Snow recognized this feature of Indigenous Nations in his sin-
gular survey of the international law of Indigenous Peoples, which Snow undertook
at the request of the United States Department of State. Snow's working definition
of Aborigines depicted them, in the spirit of the times, as "the members of uncivi-
lized tribes which inhabit a region at the time a civilized State extends its sover-
eignty over the region, and which have so inhabited from time immemorial; and
also the uncivilized descendants of such persons dwelling in the region." ALPHEUS
HENRY SNOW, THE QUESTION OF ABORIGINES IN THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF NA-
TIONS: INCLUDING A COLLECTION OF AUTHORNES AND DOCUiENTS 7 (Scholarly
Resources, Inc. 1974) (1919).
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and is relatively large. The most visible aspect of the devel-
opment of the modem state in Europe was the dramatic sim-
plification of the continent's political map, which around 1500
comprised some 150 independent political entities, and
around 1900, about 25.'
Methods of state administration did not, however, displace
non-state methods of political organization easily or complete-
ly.35 Sociologist and historian Frederick Teggart observed that
the imposition of these new methods of political organization
was accompanied by conflict and uncertainty:
[Tihe breakdown of the old organization has not been accom-
panied by the revelation of any best possible' substitute, and
so, in the stress of emergency, the old forms are made over to
do service as best they may, new forms are called by old
names, and new ideas masquerade in faded habiliments. 6
A survey of the world's political landscape today would reveal
a great many enclaves wherein the extension of state adminis-
tration remains permanently incomplete; enclaves where pre-
existing forms of political administration have been inter-
twined with state-imposed forms in the uneasy hybrid known
as tribal government.
B. The Importance of the North American Case for
Understanding Indigenous Rights Globally
Laws regulating trade between the European powers and
the Indigenous Nations of North America were developed very
early in the history of those nations' relations with one anoth-
er.37 These early laws serve as important historical precedents
34. GIANNFRANco POGGI, THE STATE: ITS NATURE, DEVELOPMENT AND PRO-
CESSES 22 (1990).
35. The Haudenosaunee or Iroquois Confederacy, for example, continues to
employ a political structure that had been established prior to the founding of
European colonies in North America. Under this structure six confederated Indige-
nous Nations "enjoy internal sovereignty, with the jurisdiction of the Grand Coun-
cil of the whole centered primarily around matters concerning inter-nation and
external relations." Howard R. Berman, Perspectives on American Indian Sovereign-
ty and International Law, 1600 to 1776, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE:
DEMOCRACY, INDIAN NATIONS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 135 (Oren R. Lyons &
John C. Mohawk eds., 1992) (citations omitted).
36. FREDERICK J. TEGGART, THEORY AND PROCESSES OF HISTORY 275 (Peter
Smith 1972) (1949).
37. See, e.g., the Massachusetts law of 1650 prohibiting "any Frenchman,
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for understanding the legal status of Indigenous Nations today.
Importantly, these laws serve as indicia of the high degree of
political and economic independence that Indigenous Nations
were acknowledged to have. Illustrating this is James
McClurken's identification of a treaty of 1836 as a turning
point in Ottawa political history:
By the time settlers came to the Great Lakes, the Ottawas
already had two hundred years of experience in dealing with
representatives of European civilization and their descen-
dants. From 1615 forward they had done so by incorporating
their traditional subsistence and economic pursuits into the
broader regional and global economy .... The 1836 Treaty of
Washington, however, ended the balanced Ottawa and Euro-
pean economic accommodation that had allowed Indian com-
munities to thrive for so long. The U.S. government acquired
ownership of and political jurisdiction over the Ottawa's core
territory and with it the control of many natural resources
that had provided the Ottawas' economic base."
Establishing relations with Indigenous Nations was an
economic imperative for the European powers,3 9 as these rela-
tions were tied closely to those powers' ability to gain access to
American territory and to the resources located therein."
Dutchman, or any person of any other foreign nation whatsoever" from trading
with Indigenous Peoples within the colony's borders. 4 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR
AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND (PART I: 1650-1660)
21. The measure sought to enhance the security of the colony by suppressing the
indigenous trade in arms:
[Tihe French, Dutch, and other fforaigne nations, doe ordjnarily trade
gunns, pouder and shott, &'c, wth Indjans, to our great pjudice, and
strengthning and annimating the Indians against vs, as by daily experi-
ence wee finde, and . . . the aforesaid French, Dutch, &'c, doe prohibite
all trade wth the Indjans wthin their respective jurisdiccons, vnder penal-
ty of confiscation, &'c.
Id. See also Several Orders made at Cascoe at a Court Houlden 26: July: 1666
[etc.] in 1 PROVINCE AND COURT RECORDS OF MAINE 268 (1928) (court order ex-
tending statutory prohibition against "the tradeing of Lyquours with the Indeans"
throughout "all the Lymitts" of Maine).
38. James M. McClurken, Wage Labor in Two Michigan Communities, in NA-
TIVE AMERICANS AND WAGE LABOR: ETHNOHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 67 (Alice
Littlefield and Martha C. Knack eds., 1996) (citations omitted).
39. As one scholar noted, "[tirade required agreements relating to access to (or
monopoly of) indigenous markets, continuous sources of furs, relative valuation of
goods, networks of supply and distribution, and defense of trade routes. Treaty-
making and stable relations were essential for all these purposes." Berman, supra
note 35, at 129.
40. In addition to being important trading partners, members of Indigenous
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States competed with one another for access to indigenous
trade and took steps to insure that their relations with Indige-
nous Nations were tranquil. The efforts of states to monopolize
indigenous trade were accompanied by constructions and re-
constructions of indigenous rights that were at once instru-
mental and ideological, facilitating the expansionist policies of
the states and providing an interpretive framework in which
expansion could be understood as an eminently moral under-
taking that was ultimately in the best interests of the world's
Indigenous Peoples. An ideology of assimilation provided an
overarching framework that state actors used to understand,
and to formulate, expansionist policies. Defenders of these
policies typically referred to a process of civilization and assim-
ilation, through which non-Europeans would learn the religion,
language and values of Europeans and become absorbed into a
larger social body. The ideology of assimilation provided a
resource with which virtually any policy could be justified. The
Georgia General Assembly exemplified this use of ideology
when they urged the federal government to remove the people
of the Cherokee Nation westward:
[A] large portion of the most valuable territory within the
chartered limits of this state, is occupied by savage tribes,
interspersed with disorderly whites, whose vicious and intem-
perate habits give the example, and afford the facility of
indulging in intoxicating liquors, a practice rapidly extin-
guishing their numbers, and entirely hostile to the progress
of civilization. Your memorialists therefore, respectfully sug-
gest, that the removal of the aforesaid white persons by gen-
eral government, and a judicious selection of commissioners
to treat with these nations for their lands, would obviate
most of the difficulties which have heretofore opposed them-
selves to the acquirement of the Indian lands; with these
advantages we should be able, easily to produce on the minds
of the most intelligent amongst them, a full conviction, that
their true interest, can only be found in their removal to a re-
gion more congenial to their nature, and remote from the
Nations also possessed valued knowledge regarding the location of resources. See,
e.g., Instructions Appointed by Me Ferdinando Gorges Lord Proprietor of the Prov-
ince of Mayne, [etc.], June 21, 1664, in 1 PROVINCE AND COURT REcoRDs OF
MAINE 202, 207 (instructing inhabitants of Province to "inform your selves by the
Natives or any other waies you can whether there be any mineral Stone such as
is like to produce Tynne Copper Lead & other").
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influence of vicious example, at the same time that civiliza-
tion might advance uninterruptedly, and their permanent
interest be secured, by applying part of the proceeds of the
sale of their lands, to the establishment of primary schools;
the annual supply of implements of husbandry, and other
conveniences of civilized life.41
The history of relationships that unfolded between the
European powers and the Indigenous Nations of North Ameri-
ca are of central importance to an understanding of interna-
tional recognition of indigenous rights today for many reasons.
Indigenous Nations of North America are leaders in the effort
to ensure that Indigenous Peoples are represented in interna-
tional forums.42 Moreover, the understandings that the Euro-
pean powers and their successor states arrived at to manage
relations with the North American Indigenous Nations were
not confined within that region, but became the conceptual
resources of the international community. While Indigenous
Nations do not enjoy a nation-to-nation relationship with other
sovereigns in the international community, they are under-
41. Memorial of Feb. 11, 1828, in 1828 LAWS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIP-
PI 144-45.
In a similar fashion, J.D.C. Atkins, a U.S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
relied on assimilationist sentiments when he championed the policy of allotment: a
policy of reducing tribal land holdings by allotting parcels to individual tribal
members and selling off the surplus. Allotment, contended Atkins, would expose
tribal members to the civilizing influence of agriculture:
Historians, philosophers, and statesmen freely admit that civilization as
naturally follows the improved arts of agriculture as vegetation follows
the genial sunshine and the shower, and that those races who are in
ignorance of agriculture are also ignorant of almost everything else. The
Indian constitutes no exception to this political maxim. Steeped as his
progenitors were, and as more than half of the race now are, in blind
ignorance, the devotees of abominable superstitions, and the victims of
idleness and thriftlessness, the absorbing query which the hopelessness of
his situation, if left to his own guidance, suggests to the philanthropist,
and particularly to a great Christian people like ours, is to know how to
relieve him from this state of dependence and barbarism, and to direct
him in paths that will eventually lead him to the light and liberty of
American citizenship.
J.D.C. Atkins, Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Oct. 5, 1885, HOUSE
ExEc. Doc. No. 1, at 3, 4, 49 Cong., 1 Sess., CONG. SERIAL SET, serial 2379.
42. See, e.g., Oren Lyons, Law, Principle, and Reality, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 209, 210 (1993) (discussing Haudenosaunee participation in the Unit-
ed Nations Conference on Environment and Development and in the Working
Group for Indigenous Populations).
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stood to have a collective identity distinct from ethnic minori-
ties.43 There is an ongoing debate among participants in the
United Nations as to whether Indigenous Nations should be
recognized as having a right to self-determination." Partici-
pants in the United Nations' Second Workshop on a Perma-
nent Forum for Indigenous People, for instance, differed over
whether indigenous political communities should be called
"indigenous people" or "indigenous peoples," some participants
being fearful that the latter term "suggested a right of self-
determination and sovereignty over natural resources."45 Oth-
er participants, however, "reiterated the importance of the
right to self-determination."46
The history of North American Indigenous Nations also
demonstrates powerfully the importance of the ability to trade
internationally. In the face of European expansion, Indigenous
Nations in North America were able to retain substantial and
recognized powers of self-government, while losing the ability
to independently establish relations with foreign powers. Their
inability to trade freely contributed to an enduring legacy of
poverty. European expansion in North America was accompa-
nied by the application of principles of international law,47 as
43. See, e.g., Delia Opekokew, International Law, International Institutions,
and Indigenous Issues, in THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS ON SELF-DETERMINATION 1, at 2-3 (Ruth Thompson ed.,
1987) (observing that the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection. of Minorities distinguishes "indigenous peoples ... from ethnic, lin-
guistic, and religious.minorities by the way they perceive land ownership and self-
determination.").
44. Opekokew notes that while the United Nations has disavowed the doctrine
and embraced the principle of self-determination with regard to nations that were
former colonies, no parallel transition has yet taken place with regard to Indige-
nous Nations:
The governments who deny the right of self-determination to indigenous
peoples have manipulated the international formulae for decolonization so
that indigenous groups have been excluded from the principles setting
out the obligations of those governments to decolonize their territo-
ries .... However, eminent international law scholars ... have extend-
ed the principle of decolonization to indigenous peoples in the Americas.
See id. at 3.
45. Report of the Second Workshop, supra note 20.
46. Indigenous Issues: Report of the Working Group Established in Accordance
with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, Comm. Hum. Rts., 54th
Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 23, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1998/106 (1997).
47. For an early international legal exposition of indigenous rights see FRAN-
CISCO DE VICTORIA, ON THE INDIANS LATELY DISCOVERED (1557), reprinted in CLAS-
SICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Ernest Nys ed., 1995) (examining and finding unper-
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well as the applications of domestic law.4
North America also is a case of critical importance because
the economic histories of North American Indigenous Nations
provides a working model for identifying barriers and impedi-
ments to indigenous commerce. By examining the history of
commercial regulation of Indigenous Nations in North Ameri-
ca, it is possible to both identify a fundamental method used
by state actors to constrain Indigenous Nations and begin to
understand how the economic constraints contributing to indig-
enous poverty might be eased.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: STATE CONTROL OF INDIGENOUS
NATIONAL TRADE
A. State Competition for Trade with Indigenous Nations
Relationships of exchange provided the primordial ground
upon which Indigenous North Americans and Europeans came
to understand one another and to arrive at a dense thicket of
law written to protect their mutual interests in peace and
trade.49 Trade provisions appeared in the earliest treaties and
suasive various arguments claiming Spanish title for indigenous national territory).
48. The United States, for example, first attempted to regulate relations with
Indigenous Nations through a series of trade and intercourse acts. See 1 Stat. 137,
Act of July 22, 1790; 1 Stat. 329, Act of Mar. 1, 1793; 1 Stat. 469, Act of May 19,
1796; 1 Stat. 743, Act of Mar. 3, 1799; 2 Stat. 139, Act of Mar. 30, 1802;
3 Stat. 682, Act of May 6, 1822; 4 Stat. 729, Act of June 30, 1834 (providing that
persons trading with Indigenous Nations be licensed and bonded, providing for the
forfeiture of merchandise involved in unlicensed trade; voiding transfers of indige-
nouns national land that were not made pursuant to a United States treaty; and
providing for the apprehension and trial of non-Indians accused of committing
crimes within indigenous nations).
49. As one author has pointed out, for many Indigenous Nations trade was
"the first, and for long periods, the only, medium of contact" with Europeans.
COLIN G. CALLOWAY, CROWN AND CALUMET BRMTISH-INDIAN RELATIONS, 1783-1815,
at 131-32 (1987). It is interesting to observe that Henry Hudson and his crew
traded with people living along the Atlantic coast and along the Hudson River.
Hudson's chronologer revealed, however, that trading was an area of mutual en-
deavor where one party could take advantage of the other and where violence
could follow fast on the heels of a misunderstanding. Hudson's crew found that
they could provision their vessel for "trifles" and occasionally resorted to violence,
as when a crew member shot an Indian to death for pilfering. Robert Ivet, The
Third Voyage of Master Henry Hudson, etc. 118, 139, 144 (1609), appended to
SAMUEL MILLER, A DISCOURSE, DESIGNED TO COMMEMORATE THE DISCOVERY OF
NEW YORK BY HENRY HUDSON (1809).
Trade came to be recognized as a source of friction with the potential for
igniting warfare. Samuel Penhallow acknowledged that many of his contemporaries
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statutes regulating state/indigenous relations.0 European
states treating with Indigenous Nations made assurances that
those nations would enjoy both trade and fair dealing.51 Trade
believed that hostilities with Indigenous Nations stemmed from English trading
practices: "many have stigmatiz'd the English as chiefly culpable in causing
the . . . Breach between them and us; by invading their Properties, and de-
frauding them in their Dealings." SAMUEL PENHALLOW, THE HISTORY OF THE WARS
OF NEW-ENGLAND, WITH THE EASTERN INDIANS 2 (Corner House Publishers, 1973)
(1726). Penhallow's account also suggests that an interest in preserving trade could
exert a pacific influence on international relations. Penhallow believed that at-
tempts to persuade the Iroquois Confederacy to join the English in their war with
various Indigenous Nations cooperating with the French failed due to fact that the
Dutch urged the Iroquois to stay neutral. As Penhallow wrote of the English fail-
ure to induce the Iroquois to wa-. "The only Account we can give of it is, the vast
trade between the Dutch and Indians; for the sake of which, that Government
have always chosen to restrain their Indians from joyning with us in our Wars."
Id. at 25-26.
Trade with the North American Indigenous Nations was placed under a
system of government regulation early on. Indeed, the treaties that concluded the
hostilities that Penhallow detailed both contained provisions for the regulation of
trade:
That for Mutual Safety and Benefit, all Trade and Comerce which may
hereafter be allowed betwixt the English and the Indians, shall be only
in such Places, and under such Management and Regulation, as shall be
stated by her Majesty's Government of the said Provinces respectively.
Articles of Pacification, July 13, 1713 [Great Britain and the Naridgwalk, the
Narahamegock, and other Indigenous Nations], Id. at 74, 76.
That all Trade and Comerce which may hereafter be allowed betwixt the
English and the Indians, shall be under such management and Regula-
tion, as the Government of the Massachusets Province shall direct.
Submission and Agreement of the Delegates of the Eastern Indians, Dec. 15, 1725,
[Great Britain and Penobscot, Naridgwalk, and other Indigenous Nations], ICE at
122, 124.
50. See, e.g., E.M. RUTTENBER, HISTORY OF INDIAN TRIBES OF HUDSON'S RIVER
TO 1700 54 (observing that a Dutch treaty of 1623 with the Mahicans expressed a
desire for "constant free trade" between the parties); see also Pennsylvania treaty
of 1701 made with the "Shawonnah" People and with the Peoples of the
"Sasquehannah" and "Powtowmeck" Rivers, 2 COLONIAL RECORDS (PENNSYLVANIA)
15, 16, 17 (requiring that the indigenous parties trade only with licensed traders
of the province; guaranteeing that the provincial government "shall take Care to
have them, the Said Indians duly furnished with all sorts of necessary Goods for
their use, at reasonable rates;" requiring the indigenous parties to conduct "them-
selves Regularly & Soberly, according to the Laws of this Governmt while they
live Near or amongst ye Christian Inhabitants thereof"; and extending to the in-
digenous parties "the full & free privileges and Immunities of all the [provincial]
Laws as any other Inhabitants").
51. For example, the Governor of New Hampshire delegated the governmental
power to treat with Indigenous Nations on behalf of England, had interpreters
advise indigenous national leaders from "Kennebeck," "Ponobscut," "Pegwacket" and
"Ammarescoggin" as follows:
Tell them, That the English Settlements that have lately been made in
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provisions contained in treaties and statutes often sought to
prevent conflict from arising from recognized sources such as
sharp trading practices or trading in liquor.52 The statutory
provisions also often strove to gain exclusive access to indig-
enous trade."
In their competition for control of resources, states sought
to create exclusive trade and military alliances with the Indig-
enous Nations.' In a treaty conference at Georgetown in 1717
these Eastern Parts, have been promoted partly on their accounts, and
that they will find the benefit of them in having Trade brought so near
them, besides the advantage of the Neighborhood and Conversation of the
English, to whom I have given strict Orders, that they be very just and
kind to the Indians, upon all accounts, and therefore if at any time, they
meet with any Oppression, Fraud, or unfair Dealing, from the English in
any of their affairs; let them make their Complaint to any of my Officers
here, and then I shall soon hear of it, and take speedy and effectual care
to do them right.
A Conference of his Excellency the Governour with the Sachems and Chief Men of
the Eastern Indians, Aug. 9, 1717, in 3 DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS RELATING TO
THE PROVINCE OF NEw-HAmiPSHIRE, FROM 1692 To 1722, at 693, 695 (1869) [here-
inafter Conference of his Excellency].
52. See, e.g., the Massachusetts Province Laws of 1693-1694, 1 ACTS AND
RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF MAssACHUSETTS BAY 150, 151 (prohibiting supply-
ing liquor to indigenous traders; providing for a forfeiture of forty shillings per
pint of liquor seized (or, if not paid, for two months' imprisonment); directing that
half of the forfeiture go to the crown and half "to him or them that shall inform
and prosecute" the forfeiture "by bill, plaint or information"). This law punished
Indians who were convicted of drunkenness by imposing a fine of five shillings for
the poor or a flogging "not exceeding ten lashes." The law sought to forward In-
digenous Peoples "in civility and Christianity," and to suppress among them
"drunkenness and other vices." Id. at 150-51.
53. See, e.g., New York's law of 1720 "for the Encouragement of the Indian
Trade," 2 COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK 8-9 (prohibiting the sale of "Indian
Goods" to the French). The New York law's preamble expressed the fear that
French/Iroquoian trade would threaten the security of the colony:
[Iut. is found by Experience that the French of Canada by meanes of
Indian Goods Purchased from the Inhabitants of this Province have not
only almost wholly Engross'd the Indian Trade to themselves but have on
great Measure withdrawne the Affections of the five Nations of Indians
from the Inhabitants of this Province and rendred them Waivering in
their faith and Aliegance to his Majesty and will if Such trade be not
prevented alltogether Alienate the minds of the Said Indians, which will
prove of the most dangerous Consequence to the English Interest in
America.
Id. at 8.
54. Illustrating this competition were the founding, in the 1720s, of trading
posts by the French at Niagara and Oswego by the British. See HERBERT L.
OSGOOD, 3 THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 375 (1924)
(contending that the "principal motive for the founding of Niagara and Oswego"
was the control of trade with Indigenous Nations). At Niagara, the French hoped
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the English made great efforts to convince the representatives
of the various nations in attendance that subjection to the
crown was in their best interests." The Indigenous national
parties were sent a British flag to carry to the negotiations "in
token of their subjection to his Majesty King George."56 Upon
their arrival they were reminded that they were King George's
"Subjects, under His Allegiance and Protection" and that they
would "always find themselves safest under the Government of
Great Britain.
" 17
The competition among states for trade with Indigenous
Nations shaped early American foreign policy, which empha-
sized creating exclusive relations with Indigenous Nations in
order to provide security against European incursions.58 When
it appeared, for example, that the Creek nation was continuing
they "and their allies among the Iroquois would control the trade of the region
between Lake Huron and the Ottawa river, inhabited by the Chippewas and other
'tribes." Id. at 365. The British founded Oswego in response. See id. at 372.
55. See Conference of his Excellency, supra note 51, at 693.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 694. A substantial source of tension in this treaty conference was
the establishment of British forts. An indigenous national representative, Wiwurna,
made objections to the erection of new forts clear to the Governor of New Hamp-
shire:
Wi. We don't know what to think of the new forts built.
Gov. I have spoke to that fully already, and told them they are for our
mutual defense.
Wi. We should be pleased with King GEORGE if there was never a Fort
in the Eastern Parts.
Gov. Tell them that whenever there is a new Settlement, I shall always
order a Fort, if I think it proper, and that it is for the security of them
and us, and so do the French. Are any People under the same Govern-
ment afraid of being made too strong to keep out Enemies?
Wi. We are a little uneasy concerning these Lands, but willing the Eng-
lish shall possess all they have done, excepting Forts.
Id. at 698. Shortly after this exchange the indigenous national representatives
withdrew from the conference until the next day, leaving their British flag behind
them. Id. at 699.
58. In August of 1789, George Washington sought the Senate's advice and
consent for a proposed treaty with the Southern nations. In addressing the Senate,
he underscored the strategic value of the anticipated agreement. The treaty, Wash-
ington contended, would not only provide for "peace and security" across "the
whole southern frontier," but was:
calculated to form a barrier against the colonies of a European Power,
which in the mutations of policy, may one day become the enemy of the
United States. The fate of the Southern States, therefore, or the neigh-
boring colonies, may principally depend on the present measures of the
Union toward the Southern Indians.
Executive Statement of Facts, Aug. 22, 1789, 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 66.
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to trade with England through Spanish ports in the South,
President George Washington proposed that the treaty with
the Creek nation include a secret article designed to end that
trade peacefully. In discussing the need for the article, Wash-
ington explained the importance of trade to the "political man-
agement" of Indigenous Nations:
In preparing the articles of this treaty, the present arrange-
ments of the trade with the Creeks have caused much embar-
rassment. It seems to be well ascertained, that the trade is
almost exclusively in the hands of a company of British mer-
chants, who, by agreement, make their importations of goods
from England into the Spanish ports.
As the trade of the Indians is a main means of their
political management, it is, therefore, obvious that the Unit-
ed States cannot possess any security for the performance of
treaties with the Creeks, while their trade is liable to be
interrupted, or withheld, at the caprice of two foreign Pow-
ers.
59
The secret article provided the federal government with
the authority to usurp the Creek trade from the British over a
two-year period:
Secret Article.
The commerce necessary for the Creek nation shall be
carried on through the ports, and by the citizens of the Unit-
ed States, if substantial and effectual arrangements shall be
made for that purpose by the United States, on or before the
1st day of August, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-
two. In the mean time, the said commerce may be carried on
through its present channels, and according to its present
regulations.
And whereas the trade of the said Creek nation is now
carried wholly, or principally, through the territories of
Spain, and obstructions thereto may happen by war or pro-
hibitions of the Spanish Government, it is therefore agreed
between the said parties that, in the event of such obstruc-
tions happening, it shall be lawful for such persons as [the
President of the United States] shall designate, to introduce
into, and transport through, the territories of the United
States to the country of the said Creek nation, any quantity
59. Message from the President, Aug. 4, 1790, 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1024-
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of goods, wares, and merchandise, not exceeding in value, in
any one year, sixty thousand dollars, and that free from any
duties or impositions whatsoever, but subject to such regula-
tions for guarding against abuse, as the United States shall
judge necessary; which privilege shall continue as long as
such obstruction shall continue.0
Ultimately treaty-making alone proved insufficient to cure the
economic independence of the Creek Nation from the United
States and the matter was resolved in a more violent manner
during the Creek War."'
60. Id. at 1025 (bracketed text added later by Senate resolution).
61. The Creek War was a regional component of the War of 1812. A major
factor drawing the United States into the larger conflict was unrest among the
Indigenous Nations to the west of the United States. The War Department attrib-
uted that unrest, in large part, to the persistence of the trade between those na-
tions and the British, PRUCHA, supra note 4, at 76-78, though the British insisted
that the "charge of exciting the Indians to offensive measures against The United
States" was "void of foundation." British Declaration, Relative to the War between
Great Britain and The United States, Jan. 9, 1813, in 1 BRITISH AND FOREIGN
STATE PAPERS 1508.
The Creek conflict in the south originated in a civil war that erupted be-
tween nativist and non-nativist factions within the Creek Nation. The conflict
reached a critical turning point in 1813 when members of the nativist fac-
tion-defined by their violent opposition to the intrusions of nonindigenous nation-
als-were attacked by settlers while returning from Pensacola, where the Spanish
had supplied them with gunpowder. In response, nati'vist warriors-or
"Redsticks--massacred the inhabitants of Fort Mims. Id. at 79. Outrage over the
incident was widespread and militias from Tennessee, Georgia, and the Territory
of Mississippi, accompanied by Choctaw, Cherokee, and non-nativist Creek allies
engaged and dispersed the nativist Creeks. See MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE POLITICS
OF INDIAN REMOvAL: CREEK GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY IN CRISIS 42 (1982).
During the peace negotiations to end the war, the British commissioners
initially insisted that any peace treaty between the two warring states must "em-
brace the Indians as Allies of His Britannic Majesty" and that a boundary be
established between the United States and "the Indian Territory," which area
would then serve as "a barrier between the British Dominions and those of The
United States." Message of the President of The United States to Congress,
transmitting Communications from the American Plenipotentiaries at Ghent, in
August and September, 1814, Relative to the Negotiation for Peace with Great
Britain, Oct. 10, 1814 in 1 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1580, 1583. The
American plenipotentiaries objected. They argued that there was no precedent for
such a boundary and attempted to differentiate their relationship with. the Indige-
nous Nations from that of Great Britain by asserting a claim to the territory in
question:
In reply to our observation, that the proposed Stipulation of an Indian
Boundary was without example in the practice of European Nations, it
was asserted that the Indians must in some sort be considered as an
independent People, since Treaties were made with them, both by Great
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Prior to the War of 1812, British influence among the
tribes to the West of the United States had been diminish-
ing.12 Following that war, competition among states to create
alliances with Indigenous Nations was, for the most part, fore-
closed.' Indigenous Nations on the frontiers, like those who
had previously been entirely surrounded by expanding states,
no longer had a viable choice over which states they could deal
with and found they had lost whatever autonomy such a choice
may have allowed them.' The conclusion of the War of 1812
Britain and by The United States; upon which we pointed out the obvi-
ous and important difference between the Treaties we might make with
Indians, living in our Territory, and such a Treaty as was proposed to be
made respecting them with a Foreign Power, who had solemnly acknowl-
edged the Territory on which they resided to be part of The United
States.
Id. at 1582.
The British commissioners ultimately abandoned their insistence on an
indigenous national territory between the United States and the British posses-
sions. The peace treaty concluding the war contained, instead, a reciprocal provi-
sion under which the United States and Great Britain agreed, respectively, to
negotiate a separate peace with each of those Indigenous Nations "with whom they
may be at war" and further agreed to restore to those nations "all the possessions,
rights, and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to ... previ-
ous to such hostilities." Treaty of Peace and Amity, Between his Britannic Majesty
and the United States of America, Dec. 24, 1814, 8 Stat. 218, 222-23.
62. See CALLOWAY, supra note 49, at 227-28 (contending that Britain had been
distracted by events in Europe from efforts to maintain relations with Indigenous
Nations, although when a conflict with the United States appeared imminent, "the
British in Canada made frantic efforts to renew their connections with the Indian
tribes to whom they had to turn for help in the event of war").
63. Competition for alliances with Indigenous Nations in North America did,
however, occur when the United States fragmented into two belligerent states. The
Confederate States of America, as Annie Abel pointed out, "assiduously sought"
and "laboriously built up" an unsteady military alliance with the Cherokee, Creek,
Choctaw, Chickasaw and Seminole nations. See ANNIE HELOISE ABEL, THE AMERI-
CAN INDIAN IN THE CIVIL WAR 15 (University of Nebraska Press, 1992) (1919). The
Confederacy forged this alliance by offering these nations more favorable treaty
terms than had existed between the nations and the United States. As Deloria
and Lytle explain:
The Confederate Treaties were probably the most favorable treaties any
Indian tribes ever signed with a foreign, non-Indian government. They
consisted of precise articles outlining the rights of the tribes, allowing
participation in the Confederate congress for tribal officials, [and] guaran-
teeing title to Indian lands ....
VINE DELORIA JR. & CLIFFORD LYTLE, THE NATIONS WTHIN: THE PAST AND FU-
TURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 24 (1984).
64. Those factions within Indigenous Nations that chose to emigrate rather
than submit to the control of the United States nevertheless did preserve some
measure of choice over which state to align with. A substantial portion of the
Cayuga Nation, for example, emigrated to Canada following the War of 1812.
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served as a watershed between the use of trade as an instru-
ment of international diplomacy and the use of trade as a tool
of state policy.
B. Single-State Monopolization of Indigenous National Trade
1. The American Reconstruction of Indigenous National
Sovereignty: The Executive Branch
By the second decade of the nineteenth century, the Unit-
ed States had fought two wars to exclude the European powers
from its territory proper and from its western frontier. In the
wake of these intercontinental crises, the North American
Descendants of the emigres brought claims before the New York legislature
in 1849, and before the Board of Commissioners of the Land Office of New York
in 1884, seeking their share of annuity payments the Cayuga Nation had received
from New York pursuant to land cession treaties made in 1790 and 1795. Cayuga
Indians v. Comm'rs, 41 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 588, 590, (3d Dep't) (holding that members
of Cayuga nation are entitled to share of annuity payments made to entire Cayu-
ga nation), rev'd Cayuga Nation of Indians v. The State, 99 N.Y. 235 (1885) (hold-
ing individual members of Cayuga nation have no cause of action under treaties
made between New York and Cayuga Nation).
The Canadian Cayuga's 1884 claim before the board of commissioners was
rejected on the advice of New York's Attorney General. Id. at 589. The Attorney
General wrote an opinion contending that although the board of land commission-
ers had jurisdiction, they should refer the matter to the legislature. Id. at 592.
The Attorney General noted that the Canadian Cayugas had not received a share
of the annuity since "their participation in the war of 1812 and 1814, as subjects
of the British crown," and that the legislature was the appropriate branch to re-
verse such a long-standing state policy. Id. at 590, 592.
A New York court disagreed, finding that the Canadian Cayugas' individual
rights in the annuity were intact. Id. at 598. As the judge observed:
It matters not where they live, whether under this government or under
that of England, their rights are the same. Nor does it matter that they
are broken up into portions and can no longer be called one nation, or
that their several rights are thus in conflict. So far as possible, the
rights of all should be protected, so that, in the way best suited to their
habits, every family .or every individual should enjoy the benefits of the
annuity.
Id. at 598.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, inasmuch as the land
cessions were made pursuant to treaties, no private right of action existed where-
by any individual member of the Cayuga Nation could sue:
The treaties were made by competent authority, and are obligatory upon
both parties. But if violated by either, the other contracting party can
alone demand satisfaction, and neither a citizen of the State, nor a mem-
ber of the "Indian Nation," nor any portion of those members, unless
recognized by the State as such, can "complain.
Cayuga Nation of Indians, 99 N.Y. at 237.
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Indigenous Nations found themselves, for the most part, deal-
ing with one state exclusively: either with Britain in Canada or
with the United States. In the absence of competition for trade
and military alliances the strategic position of the Indigenous
Nations was fundamentally altered and their political status
became subject to reinterpretation.
The reliance of the European powers and the United
States upon treaty negotiations to construct inter-governmen-
tal relations with Indigenous Nations clearly indicated that the
states regarded Indigenous Nations as having the sovereign
capacity to wage war, to establish peace, to extradite criminals
and to sign away great expanses of territory. There were, how-
ever, powers of sovereignty-such as the power to tax economic
activity taking place on the territory of the sovereign govern-
ment-that the treaties did not address. Indigenous leaders
soon discovered that these powers, not addressed in treaties,
were susceptible to redefinition by a state to accommodate that
state's economic interests. This tendency of states to narrow
indigenous powers of self-government for economic reasons is
exemplified in a tax dispute which arose early in the nine-
teenth century between the United States and the Cherokee
Nation.
The Cherokee tax dispute arose when the Cherokee Nation
taxed traders who were doing business on Cherokee lands. The
United States deducted the amounts collected from annuity
payments due the Cherokee Nation.65 The question of wheth-
er the Cherokee Nation had the sovereign power to tax trade
was referred to the United States Attorney General, William
Wirt. Wirt determined that the Cherokee Nation had not previ-
ously had such a power and could not exercise such a power
absent the approval of Congress.66
65. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 645 (1824).
66. The Principle Chief of the Cherokee Nation, John Ross, interpreted Wirt's
opinion as indicating that the United States would take no further steps until
Congress could consider the matter. See Letter of John Ross to Thomas L.
McKenney, Apr. 29, 1824, in 1 JOHN Ross, THE PAPERS OF CHIEF JOHN Ross 80
(Gary E. Moulton ed., 1985) (indicating Ross' belief that the executive branch
would delay restoration of the monies deducted from the annuities to the traders
until Congress could make a decision on the matter and requesting that the Unit-
ed States prevent non-Indian traders from permanently locating themselves on
Cherokee territory). Thomas L. McKenney, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
informed Ross that a memorial sent by the Cherokee Nation to Congress asking
for their decision on the tax issue could not be considered an appeal of Wirt's
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There was little in either the laws of the United States, in
the laws of the Cherokee Nation or in the treaties that existed
between the two nations that Wirt could use to justify a unilat-
eral abrogation of the Cherokee power to tax. Instead Wirt
relied on ideological resources and grounded his opinion in the
imagined primitive character of the Cherokee Nation when
that nation signed its earliest treaty with United States: "[tihe
first treaty was that of November 28, 1785. At that time the
nation was in the first stage of society-the hunter state; and,
consequently, government, laws, and taxes were wholly un-
known among them."67
Using his dubious understanding of Cherokee political
society in 1785 as a springboard, Wirt reinterpreted the rights
contained in the agreements the United States and the Chero-
kee Nation had concluded concerning trade. The agreements,
in Wirt's view, gave the United States an exclusive right to
regulate trade. The Cherokee Nation was pre-empted from
concomitantly regulating trade. The treaties gave the United
States a right, Wirt opined, "to prescribe the whole system of
regulations, on both sides, under which the trade should be
carried on," and subsequent treaties had simply reiterated the
United States' right to regulate the whole of the Cherokee
trade."
Wirt was aware that the Cherokee Nation had seen drastic
changes over the thirty-nine years that had passed since the
first treaty was made. Wirt attributed these changes to efforts
of the United States to civilize the Cherokees. He considered
that the Cherokee Nation may have reached a stage of civiliza-
tion where their own methods of taxation would be possible.
But, Wirt averred, whether such taxation should now be per-
mitted was a political and not a legal question:
Whether the United States, in enforcing their rights under
opinion. McKenney wrote that the amounts deducted from the annuity would be
paid over to the traders. See Letter of Thomas L. McKenney to John Ross, et al.
in ROSS, supra, at 101-02. The United States also made deductions from Cherokee
annuity funds to compensate traders who had liquor seized under authority of
Cherokee law. See Letter of John Ross to George Lowry, et al., Nov. 27, 1829, in
ROSS, supra, at 177, 178 (instructing Cherokee delegates to draft as memorial to
Congress asking for a refund of annuity money's deducted to compensate the own-
ers of the seized liquor).
67. Id. at 646.
68. Id.
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these treaties, may not and will not have respect to the al-
tered condition of the Cherokees, to the stage of civilization to
which they have been now carried by the measures adopted
by the United States to produce this very effect; whether
Congress will not adapt their future regulations to this al-
tered condition, so as to enable that nation to raise a revenue
for the support of their government, by an equal tax upon our
traders as well as their own, are political considerations
which, although it may not be improper for me to hint at
them for your consideration, are foreign to the question of
strict law, on which my opinion has been requested.69
Similarly the United States unilaterally abrogated other
Indigenous powers of sovereignty, such as the right of an indig-
enous nation to determine who could become a member of that
political community or the right of indigenous national courts
to exercise jurisdiction over matters occurring on indigenous
territory. Attorney General John MacPherson Berrien rendered
an advisory opinion, for example, on whether a United States
citizen who had become a member of the Cherokee Nation
would be exempt from provisions in the trade laws that applied
only to non-Indians. Berrien did not believe such an exemption
would be lawful. Although the trader who sought the exemp-
tion had been adopted into that portion of the Cherokee Nation
that had emigrated west of the Mississippi, he was still within
the external boundaries of the United States. As Berrien point-
ed out: "a citizen of the United states cannot divest himself of
his allegiance to this government, so long as he remains within
the limits of its sovereignty." Berrien also pointed out that if
such an exemption were widely granted it "might be employed
to the subversion of the whole legislation and policy of this
government in relation to the Indian tribes within its lim-
its."70
Attorney General Benjamin Butler rendered an opinion
advising the Secretary of War on the authority of a Choctaw
court to try a non-Indian for murder. The matter arose when a
woman-a slave held in bondage by a non-Indian residing
within Choctaw territory-was murdered by another non-Indi-
an (also a slave). The Choctaw court tried the accused and
69. Id. at 652-53.
70. 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 402 at 404, 405 (1830).
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sentenced him to death. Butler thought such a court would not
have the authority to conduct such a trial. To ground his opin-
ion in law, Butler relied on language from the Treaty of Danc-
ing Rabbit Creek that guaranteed to the Choctaw Nation "a
right to pass laws for the government of the Choctaw Nation of
Red People and their descendants,"' which language, Butler
concluded, limited the application of Choctaw law solely to
Indians. Butler recommended an Arkansas Territorial Court as
the proper forum for the matter to find resolution. He stated:
[Tihe political condition of negro slaves, owned by white men
residing in the Choctaw country, must depend on that of
their owners. And as the owner of the slave now under sen-
tence of death could not have been lawfully tried in a Choc-
taw court for the offence in question, provided it had been
committed by such owner, so neither is his slave amenable to
such court. The proper remedy will be in the United States
court for the Territory of Arkansas, to which the Choctaw
country is annexed by the Act of the 30th of June, 1834; and
it is undoubtedly the duty of the officers of the United States,
resident among the Choctaws, to take all necessary measures
to cause the offender to be brought to justice for the crime
alleged to have been committed by him.72
2. The American Reconstruction of Indigenous National
Sovereignty: The Judiciary
The task of clarifying the legal character of indigenous
sovereignty was taken up by the United States judiciary,
which issued a series of pivotal decisions73 that selectively
adumbrated the sovereign powers of Indigenous Nations for
domestic legal purposes. These decisions offered varying ap-
proaches to modifying the existing international legal structure
that existed amidst the competition among European nations
to accommodate exclusive relations between a single state and
71. Treaty of Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333 at 334 (Choctaw Nation-U.S.).
72. 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 693 at 695-96 (1834).
73. These decisions arose in response to three crises: (1) a growing confusion
surrounding transfers of lands that were once held by Indigenous Nations; (2) the
refusal of certain of the United States-and especially the Southern states-to
respect the principle of exclusive federal authority to regulate relations with Indig-
enous Nations; and (3) an uncertainty on the part of courts regarding their juris-
diction to try criminal offenses that occurred on indigenous territories.
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Indigenous Nations lying within that state's exterior bound-
aries. The opinions sought either to (1) abrogate indigenous
sovereign rights entirely, (2) preserve the earlier practice of
regarding the Indigenous Nations as having full sovereignty as
foreign nations, or (3) to regard Indigenous Nations as having
a qualified sovereignty characterized by strong internal powers
of sovereignty (powers relating to matters of self-government)
and virtually no external powers of sovereignty (powers relat-
ing to international matters outside their exclusive dealings
with a single state).
a. Decisions Urging a Complete Abrogation of Indigenous
Sovereignty.
Judges rendering opinions that argued for the complete
annulment of indigenous sovereignty took two basic approach-
es: (1) a change in circumstances approach, according to which
Indigenous Nations were acknowledged to have once been
sovereign, but were sovereign no longer due to increased com-
merce and contact with Europeans; and (2) a primitive charac-
ter of Indigenous Peoples approach, according to which Indige-
nous Peoples were regarded as being insufficiently advanced in
the arts of civilization to be considered a nation. Some, taking
the change in circumstances approach, relied on the notion
that the political status of any particular Indigenous Nation
could be re-examined by the judiciary and that the sovereign
rights of such nation could be disavowed if it appeared that
sufficient assimilation of its members had occurred. Judges
taking the fundamental character approach made a more di-
rect attack on indigenous national rights and centered their
opinions on the claim that Indigenous Peoples were too primi-
tive to form nations.74 Judges relying on that approach typi-
74. Although the two approaches seem exclusive of one another, they could
indeed be combined by arguing that the members of an Indigenous Nation were
once too primitive to be members of civil society, but had subsequently advanced
and could be governed by the laws of a nonindigenous sovereign entity. Georgia
made such an argument in The State v. George Tassels:
When America was first discovered .... discovery was considered equiva-
lent to conquest. It became therefore the duty of the discovering, or con-
quering nation, to make some provision for the aborigines, who were a
savage race, and of imbecile intellect. In ordinary conquest, one of two
modes was adopted. Either the conquered people were amalgamated with
their vanquishers, and became one people; or they were governed as a
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cally insisted that although such entities might be called "na-
tions" for reasons of political expediency, they were not nations
in fact.
Characteristic of the change in circumstances approach
was an opinion written by Chief Justice Spencer for the New
York Supreme Court,75 the state court of general jurisdiction.
An action had been brought to recover land that had once been
granted to a member of the Oneida Nation as compensation for
military service rendered during the Revolutionary War.76
Spencer expressed disdain for the notion that the Indigenous
Nations retained even a qualified sovereignty. He insisted that
the Indigenous Nations must either be fully sovereign or not
sovereign at all, and argued that the latter alternative more
accurately reflected their status:
We do not mean to say, that the condition of the Indian
tribes, at former and remote periods, has been that of sub-
jects, or citizens of the state. Their condition has been gradu-
ally changing until they have lost every attribute of sover-
eignty, and become entirely dependant upon, and subject to
our government. I know of no half-way doctrine on this sub-
ject. We either have an exclusive jurisdiction, pervading ev-
ery part of the state, including the territory held by the Indi-
ans, or we have no jurisdictions over their lands, or over
them, whilst acting within their reservations. It cannot be a
separate but dependent State. The habits, manners, and imbecile intellect
of the Indians, opposed impracticable barriers to either of these modes of
procedure. They could neither sink into the common mass of their
discoverers or conquerers, or be governed as a separate dependent people.
They were judged incapable of complying with the obligations which the
laws of civilized society imposed, or of being subjected to any code of
laws which could be sanctioned by any christian community .... But
the Cherokees now say, they have advanced in civilization, and have
formed for themselves a regular government. Admit the fact, they are
there in a situation to be brought under the influence of the laws of a
civilized State--of the State of Georgia.
The State v. George Tassels, 1 Dud. 229, 235, 36 (Ga. Super. Ct., 1830) (upholding
validity of Georgia law extending criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed on
Cherokee territory). Although Corn (or George) Tassels lawyer appealed to the
Supreme Court and received a writ of error, the Georgia legislature "voted to defy
the writ," and Tassels was hung. SIDNEY L. HARRiNG, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERI-
CAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY 29-30 (1994).
75. See Jackson v. Goodell, 20 Johns. 188 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co., 1822), rev'd
20 Johns. 693 (N.Y. Court of Errors, 1822).
76. See id.
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divided empire; it must be exclusive, as regards them, or
us....
Under Spencer's analysis indigenous sovereignty and the asso-
ciated principle of communal ownership of land dropped out of
the picture: members of Indigenous Nations would transfer
land in the same manner as state citizens, absent a specific
statute to the contrary.78 Spencer acknowledged that, subse-
quent to the sale of land at issue in his case, statutes had been
enacted regulating trade and land transfers between members
of Indigenous Nations and non-Indians. 79 Spencer did not con-
sider those statutes to be indicia of indigenous sovereignty,
however, characterizing them instead as protections for per-
sons lacking in discretion. The court did not intend, Spencer
clarified, "to question the power of the Legislature to regulate
the manner in which Indians are to convey their property, real
or personal." The legislature "may treat them" Spencer contin-
ued, "as wanting discretion to manage their property, and
devise guards and checks against frauds upon them.""
Other judicial decisions relied on the assertion that Indige-
nous Peoples were primitive to attack Indigenous National
sovereignty. Characteristic of such an approach were concur-
77. Id. at 193.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Id. A change in circumstances theory, similar to Spencer's, was employed
by Justice John McClean to argue that the state of Ohio, and not the federal
government, had jurisdiction over a crime committed by a non-Indian on Wyandott
territory. United States v. Cisna, 25 F. Cas. 422 (C.C.D. Ohio, 1835). McClean
argued that a federal trade statute placing jurisdiction over such crimes in the
federal government had been rendered "inoperative by the progress of time and
the change of circumstances." Id. at 424. McClean asserted that the statute was
based solely on the legislative power "[tio regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian
Tribes," U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and that when circumstances rendered that
exercise of that constitutional power impracticable, the exercise of the power
"must... of necessity cease." Cisna, 25 F. Cas. 425. The changes on which
McClean based his opinion were the diminution of Wyandott territory from "a very
extensive territory," Id. at 423, to a territory of "twelve miles square" and the
establishment of regular trading between the Wyandott Nation and the Ohioans
that lived proximate to that nation's territory: "Stores and taverns are kept within
the reservation by the Indians or those connected with them, which are as much
resorted to for trade and other purposes, by the surrounding white population, as
similar establishments in any other part of the country." Id. at 424. As David
Getches and his co-author's point out, McClean's attempt to limit the congressional
commerce power to "the regulation commercial intercourse," ultimately did not
prevail. GETcHEs ET AL. (3d ed.), supra note 18, at 150.
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ring opinions in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,"' which agreed
with the decision Chief Justice Marshall authored finding that
the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over the case.
Whereas Marshall found that the Cherokee Nation was a "do-
mestic dependent nation"-and not a foreign state within the
meaning of the Constitutions---the concurring justices conclud-
ed that the Cherokee Nation was not a nation at all.
Justice Johnson, for instance, posed three questions to
determine whether the Cherokee Nation had been recognized
81. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). The backdrop for the Cherokee Nation case was
a sectional crisis within the United States touched off by the southern states as-
serting the right to fashion their own policy with regard to the southeastern Indig-
enous Nations. The southern states passed a series of laws that were intended to
undermine indigenous national sovereignty. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 19, 1830,
1830 LAWS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 5, (extending Mississippi jurisdiction
across Choctaw and Chickasaw territories and imposing criminal penalties upon
"any person or persons who shall assume on him or themselves, and exercise in
any manner whatever the office of chief, mingo, head-man or other post of power,
established by tribal statutes, ordinances or customs"), id. at 6; 1832 Acts of the
State of Alabama 7, Act of Jan. 16, 1832 (extending Alabama jurisdiction across
Creek and Cherokee territories and abolishing indigenous national law); and
1833 Public Acts of the State of Tennessee 10, Act of Nov. 8, 1833 (extending
Tennessee jurisdiction across Cherokee territory). .
Relations between Georgia and the Cherokee Nation were particularly
strained by two events: gold was discovered on Cherokee territory and when the
Cherokee Nation reinforced their sovereignty by adopting a constitution modeled
on that of the United States. See CHARLES WARREN, 1 THE SUPREME CoURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 731 (1937). The Georgia legislature passed a series of
statutes abridging Cherokee sovereignty. See 1828 Acts of the State of Georgia 88,
98, Act of Dec. 20, 1828 (nullifying "all laws, usages, and customs" of the Chero-
kee Nation and annexing Cherokee territory to five Georgia counties); 1829 Acts of
the State of Georgia 98, 99, Act of Dec. 19, 1829 (expanding provisions of the
1828 Act); 1830 Acts of the State of Georgia 154, Act of Dec. 2, 1830 (authorizing
governor to take possession of gold and silver mines within Cherokee territory);
1830 Acts of the State of Georgia 127, Act of Dec. 21, 1830 (providing for distribu-
tion of unimproved Cherokee lands to Georgia citizens by land lottery); 1830 Acts
of the State of Georgia 115, 116, Act of Dec. 22, 1830 (prohibiting Cherokees from
assembling for governmental purposes and authorizing governor to organize a force
of up to sixty persons to enforce state laws and to protect non-Cherokee mining
operations within Cherokee territory). The Cherokee Nation, in response, brought
an original bill in equity before the Supreme Court seeking an injunction against
the enforcement of Georgia statutes on Cherokee territory. See Cherokee Nation, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) at 2. As memorialists generated support for the rights of the Indige-
nous Nations in the Northeast, the Supreme Court was faced with what Charles
Warren described as the most serious crisis in its history. See New York Memorial
(1829) in Jeremiah Evarts, CHEROKEE REMOVAL: THE "WILLIAm PENN" ESSAYS AND
OTHER WRITINGS 212 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1981); WARREN, supra, at 729.
82. U.S. CONST. Art. III, sec. 2 (extending the 'judicial Power . . . to all Cas-
es . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States").
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as a state: "1. By whom are they acknowledged as such? 2.
When did they become so? 3. And what are the attributes by
which they are identified with other States?"83 Johnson's an-
swers to these questions did not discuss the long history of
diplomacy between the Indigenous Nations and the European
powers to establish trade and military alliances. It focused
instead on the present circumstances of the Cherokee Nation
as an entity isolated from international relations:
As to the first question, it is clear that as a State they are
known to nobody on earth but ourselves, if to us: how, then,
can they be said to be recognized as a member of the commu-
nity of nations? Would any nation on earth treat them as
such? Suppose when they occupied the banks of the Missis-
sippi or the sea coast of Florida... they had declared war
and issued letters of marque and reprisal against us or Great
Britain, would their commissions be respected? If known as a
State, it is by us and by us alone; and what are the proofs?
The treaty of Hopewell does not even give them a name other
than that of the Indians; not even nation or State: but re-
gards them as what they were, a band of hunters, occupying
as hunting-grounds just what territory we chose to allot to
them.'
Johnson's argument took into account the fact that there
were states in Europe whose political autonomy had been com-
promised by their relations with more powerful states, but
which were nevertheless considered to retain sovereign powers.
He was nevertheless able to distinguish the Cherokee Nation
from thbse states on the basis of property rights: "They have in
Europe sovereign and demi-sovereign states and states of
doubtful sovereignty. But if this State, if it be a State, is still a
83. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 24.
84. Id. Johnson warned that one consequence of recognition of the Cherokee
Nation as a state would be that it would encourage the recognition of the national
sovereignty of other Indigenous Nations:
There is one consequence that would necessarily flow from the recogni-
tion of this people as a State, which of itself must operate greatly
against its admission.
Where is the rule to stop? Must every petty kraal of Indians,
designating themselves a tribe or nation, and having a few hundred acres
of land to hunt on exclusively, be recognized as a State? We should in-
deed force into the family of nations a very numerous and very heteroge-
neous progeny.
Id. at 25.
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grade below them all; for not to be able to alienate without
permission of the remainderman or lord, places them in a state
of feudal dependence."'
b. The View that Indigenous Nations are Fully Sovereign
Foreign Nations
A dissenting opinion in the Cherokee Nation case took the
position that the Cherokee Nation was a fully sovereign foreign
state and that the Supreme Court therefore had jurisdiction
over the controversy. Justice Thompson, joined by Justice Sto-
ry, based the dissent on the long-standing state practice of
making treaties with Indigenous Nations86 and upon sections
85. Id. at 26-27. Here Justice Johnson was departing from an earlier position
he had taken in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). In that case the
ability of Georgia to grant indigenous national lands was called into question.
Chief Justice Marshall, for the majority, determined that Georgia could be "seised
in fee of lands" that were, at the same time, held by an Indigenous Nation under
"Indian title." Id. at 142-43. Justice Johnson, in dissent, cast doubt on the propri-
ety of applying the concept of fee-simple to "the interests of a nation" and insisted
that a correct analysis of the situation before the Court hinged on "a just view of
the state of the Indian nations:"
Some have totally extinguished their national fire, and submitted them-
selves to the laws of the states[;] others have, by treaty, acknowledged
that they hold their national existence at the will of the state within
which they reside[;] others retain a limited sovereignty, and the absolute
proprietorship of their soil. The latter is the case of the tribes to the
west of Georgia. We legislate upon the conduct of strangers or citizens
within their limits, but innumerable treaties formed with them acknowl-
edge them to be an independent people, and the uniform practice of
acknowledging their right of soil, by purchasing from them, and restrain-
ing all persons from encroaching upon their territory, makes it unneces-
sary to insist upon their right of soil.
Id. at 146-47.
A state's interest in the territory of an Indigenous Nation was nothing
more, Johnson insisted, than the "pre-emptive right," to prevent other states from
acquiring such territories as the Indigenous Nations might be willing to part with:
What, then, practically, is the interest of the states in the soil of the
Indians within their boundaries? Unaffected by particular treaties, it is
nothing more than what was assumed at the first settlement of the coun-
try, to wit, a right of conquest or of purchase, exclusive of all competitors
within certain defined limits. All the restrictions upon the right of soil in
the Indians, amount only to an exclusion of all competitors from their
markets; and the limitation upon their sovereignty amounts to the right
of governing every person within their limits except themselves.
Id.
86. Indeed, as Thompson pointed out, the law of nations understood a treaty,
by definition, to be "an agreement or contract between two or more nations or
sovereigns." Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 60.
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of Emmerich de Vattel's influential87 treatise on international
law' that took the position that a comparatively weak state
could accept the protection of a more powerful state without
surrendering its sovereignty.89
Thompson's opinion took great care to establish that noth-
ing in its practice of making treaties with states suggested
that the Cherokee Nation had lost its status as an independent
nation. The Cherokee Nation had rather:
been treated as a people governed solely and exclusively by
their own laws, usages and customs within their own territo-
ry, claiming and exercising exclusive dominion over the same;
yielding up by treaty, from time to time, portions of their
87. Justice Lewis Powell observed that in the United States Vattel was the
"international jurist most widely cited in the first 50 years after the revolution."
U.S. Steel Corp. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 462 n. 11 (1978), citing 1
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 18 (1826).
88. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATU-
RAL LAW 38 (1758) (Book 1, Section 81) (Charles G. Fenwick, Trans., Carnegie
Institution of Washington, 1916), reprinted in JAMES B. SCOTr, THE CLASsIc OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1995.
89. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 53, 55. Vatters treatise also served as
a resource for lawyers and jurists whose interests were adverse to indigenous
national sovereignty. For instance, counsel in Fletcher v. Peck, seeking to argue
that indigenous title to land should not preclude Georgia from granting that land,
relied on Vattel to argue that "Indian title" was no title at all:
What is the Indian title? It is a mere occupancy for the purpose of hunt-
ing. It is not like our tenures; they have no idea of a title to the soil
itself. It is overrun by them, rather than inhabited. It is not a true and
legal possession. Vattel, b. 1, § 81, p. 37, and § 209; b. 2, § 97.
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 121 (1810).
In the sections cited by counsel, Vattel had propounded a natural law-based
obligation of nations to "cultivate the land which has fallen to its share," and had
pointed to what he characterized as the marginal status of "idle" peoples who
were not sufficiently agricultural in their endeavors:
There are others who, in order to avoid labor, seek to live upon their
flocks and the fruits of the chase. This might well enough be done in the
first age of the world, when the earth produced more than enough, with-
out cultivation, for the small number of its inhabitants. But now that the
human race has multiplied so greatly, it could not subsist if every people
wished to live after that fashion. Those who still pursue this idle mode
of life occupy more land than they would have need of under a system of
honest labor, and they may not complain if other more industrious Na-
tions, too confined at home, should come and occupy part of their homes.
In Book 1, Section 209, Vattel wrote that the "Nations of Europe" may "lawfully
take possession of' whatever "lands which the savages have no special need of and
are making no present and continuous use of." Id. at 85. In Book 2, Section 97,
Vattel reiterated his view that the Indigenous Nations in North America had no
right to possess "the whole of that vast continent." Id. at 143.
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land but still claiming absolute sovereignty and self-govern-
ment over what remained unsold.90
While Thompson acknowledged that some Indigenous Nations
had lost the capacity to be self-governing and existed as "mere
remnants of tribes,"91 he made it clear that the Cherokee Na-
tion and many other Indigenous Nations had:
never been, by conquest, reduced to the situation of subjects
to any conqueror, and thereby lost their separate national
existence and the rights of self-government, and became
subject to the laws of the conqueror. Whenever wars have
taken place, they have been followed by regular treaties of
peace, containing stipulations on each side according to exist-
ing circumstances; the Indian nation always preserving its
distinct and separate national character.92
Thompson also found support for his dissent in Vattel's
treatise on International law.93 Vattel had written that a
state could accept the protection of a more powerful state with-
out surrendering its sovereignty:
[A] weak State, that, in,order to provide for its safety, places
itself under the protection of a more powerful one without
stripping itself of the right of government and sovereignty,
does not cease on this account to be placed among the sover-
eigns who acknowledge no other power. Tributory and feu-
datory States do not thereby cease to be sovereign and inde-
pendent States so long as self-government and sovereign and
independent authority is left in the administration of the
State. Vattel, c. 1, pp. 16, 17.9'
90. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 53.
91. Id. at 74.
92. Id. at 55-56.
93. Justice Baldwin, in a concurring opinion concluding that Indigenous Na-
tions could not be considered nations, disavowed any resort to international law to
resolve the question of "whether the Indians were considered and treated with as
tribes of savages or independent nations . .. ." Id. at 32. Baldwin preferred, in-
stead, to "expound the Constitution without a reference to the definitions of a
State or nation by any foreign writer. .. ." Id. at 40-41. Examining previous
cases decided by the Court, Baldwin concluded that Indigenous Nations had not
been considered to be nations, but rather "were considered as tribes of fierce sav-
ages; a people with whom it was impossible to mix, and who could not be gov-
erned as a distinct society." Id. at 48.
94. Id. at 53. It is a basic principle of international law that all states are
equal; that a political entity does not become a nation on the basis of size or
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c. The View that Indigenous Nations are Quasi-sovereign
Domestic dependent Nations.
The majority opinion in Cherokee Nation determined that
Indigenous Nations were not foreign states and that the Court
could not, therefore, constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over
the case. Marshall's opinion left no doubt that he considered
the Indigenous Nations to be states,95 although he questioned
whether they could properly be considered to be "foreign"
states. In highly influential and widely cited dicta,96 Marshall
reaffirmed the national rights of Indigenous Nations, not as
foreign nations, but as domestic dependent nations:
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestion-
able, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they
occupy until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary
cession to our government, yet it may well be doubted wheth-
er those tribes which reside within the acknowledged bound-
aries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be de-
nominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, per-
strength. Oren Lyons, a traditional chief of the Onondaga Nation, expressed this
foundational idea of the international community as follows:
Principled, honorable, international councils agree that size does not de-
fine equality. Inherent in all discussions is that the integrity of a nation
lies in the spiritual and moral will of its people. And so when the na-
tions gather, some may be richer, some may be poorer, some may be
stronger, and some weaker, but in principle, all agree that they are
equal. As we are.
Lyons, supra note 42, at 211.
95. Marshall wrote that the Cherokee Nation had:
been uniformly treated as a State from the settlement of our country.
The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize
them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war,
of being responsible in their political character for any violation of their
engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of the
United States by any individual of their community.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
96. The definition in Cherokee Nation of Indigenous Nations as "domestic de-
pendant nations"--coupled with the holdings in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823) (defining indigenous national title to territory as a right of
occupancy), and in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832), that
state law cannot extend to indigenous territory-forms the basic foundation for
modem law concerning Indigenous Nations in the United States. The basic princi-
ples set forth in these cases have been embraced by courts in the British Com-
monwealth countries. See, e.g., Regina v. Van der Peet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, 306-07
(1996) (relying on Johnson and Worcester to discuss history and legal consequences
of European exploration and occupation of North America).
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haps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They
occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of
their will, which must take effect in point of possession when
their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a
state of pupilage. Their relation to the United states resem-
bles that of a ward to his guardian. 97
C. An International Dichotomy at the Berlin African
Conference
Several decades after the international competition for
access to the Americas had subsided, a similar competition for
access to the African continent came to be recognized as an
international crisis." At the urging of Germany and France,
several nations convened at the Berlin Conference to deter-
mine how they could co-operate to regulate and insure freedom
of commerce in Western Africa. 99 A by-product of such free
97. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
98. John Kasson, a member of the American Legation at Berlin, expressed the
fear that this crisis would move some of the states involved to belligerent actions:
Almost daily notices reach us either of efforts on the part of some Euro-
pean nation to take actual possession of unoccupied coasts or islands or
sections of the interior, or of the dispatch of vessels of war to those re-
gions for some unavowed purpose. Thus, during the last few days, we
hear of the dispatch of two naval vessels by Italy, and of the immediate
departure of one of the Spanish vessels from Cadiz; and of the reported
importation at Lisbon of a Congo native chief to claim the protection of
that Government against other European encroachments.
Letter from John A. Kasson to Frederick Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State, Nov.
3, 1884, in A REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE RELATIVE TO AFFAIRS OF THE
INDEPENDENT STATE OF THE CONGO 20 S. EXEc. Doc. No. 196, 49th Cong., 1st
Sess., (1886) (alteration in original) [hereinafter AFFAIRS OF THE INDEPENDENT
STATE OF THE CONGO].
99. As Secretary of State Frelinghuysen wrote, the Conference sought to cre-
ate "a great state in the heart of Western Africa, whose organization and adminis-
tration shall afford a guarantee that it is to be held for all time ... in trust for
the benefit of all peoples . . . ." Letter from Frelinghuysen to John Kasson, Oct. 3,
1884, in AFFAIRS OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF THE CONGO, supra note 98, at
13, 14. Alpheus Snow described the result of the Berlin African Conference as the
creation of a "Middle-African Zone of International Jurisdiction:"
IThe conference ... created a political and territorial institution affect-
ing territory greater in extent than that described as "the heart of west-
ern Africa," and having in some respects the character or, at least, the
possibilities of a "great State" administering a "trust for all peoples."
The first step taken by the conference in this respect was the
establishment of a "conventional basin of the Congo," which was in fact
all middle Africa from ocean to ocean, including substantially all the
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trade would be, the participants believed, the protection of the
rights and interests of the Indigenous Peoples residing
there.100
Participants at the Berlin Conference expressed concern
over "the development, material and moral, of the indigenous
populations."'0 ' Echoing Chief Justice Marshall's description
of U.S./indigenous relations as resembling "that of a ward to
his guardian,"' 2 the participants determined that the confer-
ence would become the official guardian of the indigenous
African nations affected:
In regard to these populations, which for the most part
should, without doubt, be considered as finding themselves
without the community of the law of nations, but who, in the
present state of affairs, are scarcely qualified to defend their
own interests, the Conference has thought proper to assume
the role of official guardian. The necessity of securing the
preservation of aborigines, the duty to aid them to attain
higher political and social status, the obligation to instruct
country between the Sahara Desert on the north and the rivers forming
the northern boundary of what has since become South Africa.
Over this middle African zone the conference assumed what came
very near to being an international over-sovereignty, supreme over the
sovereignties exercised by the States having colonies in the zone. It de-
creed a r~gime in the nature of a supreme law of the land for the re-
gion, which the States having colonies in the region obligated themselves
to follow, but which none of the States participating in the conference
obliged itself to enforce. The zone established seems fairly to be described
as one of international jurisdiction ....
SNOW, supra note 33, at 145.
100. The conference participants' primary economic goal of regulating trade in
Western Africa and their secondary moral goal of protecting Indigenous West Afri-
cans could be linked, as Prince von Bismarck, Chancellor of the German Empire,
made clear during his welcoming remarks:
"In extending its invitations to this Conference, the Imperial Government
was guided by the conviction that all the Governments invited shared the
desire to promote the civilization of the natives of Africa by opening the
interior of that continent to commerce, by furnishing the means of in-
struction to its inhabitants, by encouraging missions and enterprises
calculated to diffuse useful knowledge, and by preparing the way to the
abolition of slavery, and especially of the slave trade . . ..
Protocol No. 1. (Nov. 15, 1884), in AFFAMS OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF THE
CONGO, supra note 98, at 25.
101. Report Made in the Name of the Commission Charged to Examine the
Proj~t de Declaration Concerning Liberty of Commerce in the Basin of the Congo
and its Affluents [hereinafter Commission Report], in AFFAIRS OF THE INDEPEN-
DENT STATE OF THE CONGO, supra note 98, at 76.
102. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
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and initiate them into the advantages of civilization are
unanimously recognized.
It is the future of Africa which is here at issue. No dis-
sent manifested itself, in this respect in the commission."
The Berlin Conference was an attempt to avoid the single-
state monopolization of trade that had occurred in North
America, which the participants believed would also protect
indigenous national interests." State monopolization of
trade nevertheless took place, the most conspicuous example
being Belgium's control over the Congo Free State. The Congo
Free State had been organized under the auspices of the Inter-
national African Association, a private international associa-
tion controlled by Belgium." 5 As journalist and sociologist
103. Commission Report, supra note 101. Of particular concern to the confer-
ence participants was the practice of slave holding and the traffic in slaves. The
former scourge would disappear, the participants believed, as the civilizing influ-
ences of international commerce were extended throughout Africa. The slave trade,
however, involved violations of norms so basic that the participants were of the
opinion that it should be actively repressed when the international community was
in a position to do so:
Two heavy scourges weigh on the actual condition of the African people,
and paralyze their development-slavery and the trade. Every one
knows ... what deep roots slavery has in the constitution of the African
societies. Certainly this malevolent institution should disappear;, it is the
condition even of all progress, economic and political; but superinten-
dence, changes will be indispensable. It is enough to indicate the object;
the local governments will seek the means and adapt them to the time
and the instrumentality .... The trade has another character; it is the
negation even of all law, of all social order. The hunting of men is a
crime of treason against humanity. It should be repressed wherever it
will be possible to extinguish it, on land as on sea.
Id.
104. As Snow points out, the conference participants believed that their goal of
freedom of commerce could not be realized unless Indigenous African Nations were
"given their proper and just relationship to the civilized governments and their
citizens, and peace and order prevails." SNOW, supra note 33, at 147.
105. Snow described the origins of this organization as follows:
The International African Association was the result of an international
conference of geographical societies held at Brussels in 1876, which had
been suggested in various quarters, but was actually called by King
Leopold II of Belgium. Belgium was under a neutrality guaranteed by
Great Britain, France, and Germany, and was not a colonizing power. It
was doubtless felt that an international agency to civilize Africa would be
more likely to appeal to the public as truly international if it had its
foundation in Belgium, than if it were founded in one of the colonizing
States. Leopold II, having interested himself in geography and explora-
tion, naturally was elected to the presidency.
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Robert Park revealed, the Congo Free State became a Belgian
colony in which trade was tightly controlled.' Park ex-
plained, Leopold initially encouraged international commerce
in the Congo Free State and then:
crowded out or absorbed all private trade in 800,000 of the
900,000 square miles of territory in the state. Trade was
supplanted by taxation. The territory of the state has been
parceled out among stock companies, who pay fifty per cent
of the profit to the state for the privilege of assessing and
collecting these taxes. The men employed to collect the taxes
are mostly armed Savages.
Leopold says the results are civilization. The missionar-
ies say they are hell. But everybody admits they are profitable.
At the close of the Berlin Conference in 1885 the world
looked upon the Congo State as a sort of international colony
of which King Leopold had been appointed trustee. By the
time he had begun to capitalize its wealth and the labor of its
people, and to sell the stocks on the Brussels Exchange, the
Congo had come to be regarded as a Belgian colony.1"
The human rights abuses visited upon the Indigenous Peoples
of the Congo under Leopold's system of extraction were severe.
In Park's words it was a "system more ruthless than any the
world has known since the Spanish conquest of America."'
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF INDIGENOUS COMMERCE IN NORTH
AMERICA
A. The Adumbration of Indigenous National Sovereignty as a
Barrier to Participation in Commerce
The historic adumbrations of indigenous national sover-
eignty discussed in the previous section serve to impede indige-
nous participation in international trade by interposing a sys-
tem of municipal law between Indigenous Nations and interna-
tional markets. This interposition limits both indigenous access
Id. at 133.
106. Robert E. Park, A King in Business: Leopold 11 of Belgium, Autocrat of the
Congo and International Broker (1906), in STANFORD M. LYMAN, MILITARISM, IMPE-
RIALISm, AND RACIAL AccoimODATIoN: AN ANALYSIS AND INTRPRETATION OF THE
EARLY WRITINGS OF ROBERT E. PARK 218-19 (1992).
107. Id. at 218.
108. Robert E. Park, Recent Atrocities in the Congo State (1904), in LYMAN,
supra note 106, at 205.
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to natural resources as well as indigenous opportunity to intro-
duce such resources into commerce. Whereas a state would
have an inherent right to exploit natural resources lying with-
in its territory for commercial purposes, subject only to what-
ever conservation or other measures it may voluntarily assent
to by treaty,0 9 an Indigenous Nation must comply with a sys-
tem of state-imposed restrictions."' The national legal barri-
er to indigenous trade is illustrated in the Canadian Supreme
Court's recent decisions on the extent to which regulations can
impinge on indigenous fishing, an important economic activity
for many Indigenous Nations."'
These decisions interpret a broad statutory recognition of
aboriginal rights that is contained in Section 35(1) of the Con-
stitution Act, 1982." The Court, in determining to what ex-
109. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.],
1969 I.C.J. 3, 22. The International Court of Justice there discussed the inherent
sovereign right of states to exploit natural resources on the continental shelf:
[Tihe rights of the coastal state in respect of the area of continental shelf
that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and un-
der the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty
over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural
resources. In short, there is here an inherent right. In order to exercise
it, no special legal process has to be gone through, nor have any special
legal acts to be performed. Its existence can be declared (and many
States have done this) but does not need to be constituted. Furthermore,
the right does not depend on its being exercised. To echo the language of
the Geneva Convention, it is "exclusive" in the sense that if the coastal
State does not choose to explore or exploit the areas of Shelf appertain-
ing to it, that is its own affair, but no one else may do so without its
express consent.
Id.
110. These restrictions may be statutory in nature or may be the products of
decisional law. A restriction on indigenous national commerce in the United States
is the common law doctrine of Utah & Northern Railway v. Fisher whereby state
governments can tax economic activity on tribal territory where the tax does not
interfere with an indigenous national interest. Although Chief Justice Marshall's
well known discussion in McColluch v. Maryland might suggest that any state
taxation would interfere with a paramount indigenous national interest in preserv-
ing political independence, courts over the decades have extended the Utah &
Northern Railway doctrine to great and intrusive lengths. See Utah & N. Railway
v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 29 (1885).
111. See Regina v. Adams, 138 D.L.R.4th 657 (1996) (holding that Mohawks
have "the aboriginal right to fish for food . . . , as opposed to the right to fish
commercially, is a right which should be given first priority after conservation
concerns are met"); Regina v. Van der Peet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, 306-07 (1996)
(holding that Sto:lo have no aboriginal right to sell fish).
112. Constitution Act, 1982, § 35(1) provides that "The existing aboriginal and
BROOK. J. INTL L.
tent fishing regulations can be enforced against members of
Indigenous Nations, has placed the aboriginal right to fish on a
hierarchy: aboriginal rights fall below conservation and com-
mercial fishing interests in importance, but are superior to the
interest in sports fishing, at least in cases where sports fishing
lacks "a meaningful commercial dimension.""'
The Court in these cases recognized two types of aborigi-
nal rights: (1) aboriginal title to land and related rights based
on such title; and (2) aboriginal rights that "exist independent-
ly of a claim to aboriginal title," the so-called "free-standing
aboriginal rights." 4 A challenge to the application of fishing
regulations to members of an Indigenous Nation, when it is
based on an assertion of a free-standing right, must be sup-
ported by a showing that the right was part of the traditional
customs and practices of the nation in question: "in order to be
an aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a prac-
tice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of
the aboriginal group claiming the right.""5
The Court determined that only the customs and practices
of an Indigenous Nation prior to contact with Europeans could
support a claim based on an aboriginal right and then only if
there is sufficient continuity between pre-contact and practices
today: "The practices, customs and traditions which constitute
aboriginal rights are those which have continuity with the
traditions, customs and practices that existed prior to con-
tact.""' Even where a practice is integral to an indigenous
culture and sufficient continuity with pre-contact indigenous
culture can be shown, a regulation that infringes on an aborigi-
nal right may be upheld if the infringement is justified."'
It is important to note that judges who are more sympa-
treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and af-
firmed."
113. See Regina v. Adams, 138 D.L.R.4th at 679.
114. Id. at 660, 661.
115. Regina v. Van der Peet, 137 D.L.R.4th at 310. It is not sufficient under
Van der Peet to merely show that a custom or practice claimed as a right 'was
an aspect of, took place in, the aboriginal society." A claimant rather must show
that the right claimed was "integral" by "demonstrating that the practice, tradition
or custom was a central and significant part of the society's distinctive cul-
ture . . . -that it was one of the things that truly made the society what it was."
Id. at 313-14.
116. Id. at 315.
117. See Regina v. Adams, 138 D.L.R.4th at 678.
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thetic to the promotion of indigenous national commerce have
a different reading of history. The British Columbia Court of
Appeals, in upholding an aboriginal right to sell fish, believed
that the Sto:lo and other Indigenous Nations of the "Upper
Great Lakes" did indeed participate in "a far-flung trade and
exchange network which extended at least as far south as the
Gulf of Mexico."" 8 Furthermore, not willing to "freeze" ab-
original rights at an arbitrary point in history-at contact-the
British Columbia court described the Sto:lo's participation in
the cured salmon trade during the nineteenth century. The
court described how records of the Sto:lo trade in fish from
1830 to 1873 revealed that this commercial activity grew
steadily and was not limited to the Great Lakes region. Fish
supplied by the Sto:lo were traded to the Hudson's Bay Compa-
ny, which, in turn: "established a major market for very signif-
icant quantities of cured salmon in the Sandwich Islands [and]
tried to establish markets in the United States at San Francis-
co, in China, in England and in Tahiti.""'
A substantial barrier to indigenous commerce in the Unit-
ed States is the ability of state governments to tax economic
activities occurring on tribal territories under Utah & Northern
Railway v. Fisher.' Under Utah & Northern Railway, the
Supreme Court determined that a railroad company was not
exempt from paying taxes to a territorial government on 69
miles of its track running across the Fort Hill Reservation.'2
The case held that, inasmuch as no indigenous national inter-
est was infringed, the territory could tax the railroad. " This
holding soon gave rise to a widely-applied doctrine under
which state governments justified taxing any economic activity
save that conducted exclusively between members of Indige-
nous Nations. Although the doctrine is based on the assump-
tion that such taxation infringes upon no indigenous national
interest, an examination of the decisions that cite Utah &
Northern Railway for support reveal that, to the contrary, the
economic interests that state taxation affected were wide-rang-
118. Regina v Van der Peet, 83 C.C.C. 3d 289, reo'd 137 D.L.R.4th 289 (1993)
(quoting United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 at 223 (1979)).
119. Id.
120. Utah & N. Railway v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 29 (1885).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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ing and important. These economic interests included-in addi-
tion to taxes on a railroad 2--taxes on cattle grazing;' tax-
es on the property of nonindigenous persons residing on tribal
territories;" mining operations;" and cigarette sales. 27
Utah & Northern Railway has also been cited to support terri-
torial intrusions made upon Indigenous Nations," a state
123. See Maricopa & Phoenix R.R. Co. v. Territory of Arizona, 156 U.S. 347
(1895) (tax by the Territory of Arizona on 6.24 miles of railroad lying within the
Gila River Reservation valid).
124. See Torrey v. Baldwin, 26 P. 908 (Wyo. 1891) (Shoshone Reservation is
within the Territory of Wyoming and cattle grazed on that reservation by
nonindigenous nationals can properly be taxed by the territorial government);
Truscott v. Hurlbut Land & Cattle Co., 73 F. 60, 62 (9th Cir. 1896) (Montana
may validly tax nonindigenous-owned cattle grazing carried out pursuant to leases
with the Crow Nation, notwithstanding an Indian agreement of 1882 [22 Stat. 42]
directing the Secretary of the Interior to "fix the amount to be paid" by parties
permitted to graze cattle on tribal lands and directing that "all moneys arising
from this source" be paid to the Crow Nation); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 263(1897) (upholding the validity of an Oklahoma Territorial tax on nonindigenous-
owned cattle that were grazed on Osage and Kansas tribal territories pursuant to
tribal leases).
125. See Coey v. Cleghorn, 79 P. 72 (Idaho 1904) (attachment levied against
the property of a nonindigenous national farmer residing on the Cceur d'Alene
Reservation held valid); Lebo v. Griffith, 173 N.W. 841 (S.D. 1919) (school board
validly included. portion of Cheyenne River Reservation within its boundaries and
properly taxed nonindigenous national residing therein); Fort Mojave Tribe v. San
Bernardino County, 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976) (San Bernardino County's pos-
sessory interest tax placed on nonindigenous lessees of indigenous national [Fort
Mojave] land valid); Chief Seattle Properties v. Kitsap County, 541 P.2d 699
(Wash. 1976) (State may collect personal property tax on leasehold interest and
improvements of nonindigenous lessee of Suquamish land).
126. See In re Skelton Lead & Zinc Co.'s Gross Prod. Tax for 1919, 197 P. 495
(Okla. 1921) (state tax on the gross production of minerals from nonindigenous-
owned mining operations located within lands allotted to the Quapaw Nation and
held in trust by the federal government held valid); Protest of Bendelari, Gross
Prod. Tax, 1919, 198 P. 606 (Okla. 1921) (same).
127. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980) (holding that "principles of federal Indian law whether
stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal self-government, or otherwise" do not autho-
rize Indigenous Nations "to market an exemption from state taxation to persons
who would normally do their business elsewhere." Washington could therefore
validly tax cigarettes sold on tribal territories to nonindigenous nationals and
enforce such tax through seizures of untaxed cigarettes en route to indigenous
national territories).
128. See King v. M'Andrews, 104 F. 430, 435 (C.C.D.S.D. 1900); rev'd 111 F.
860 (8th Cir. 1901) (1885 extension of the corporate limits of the City of Cham-
berlain into the Great Sioux Reservation was valid inasmuch as "the inclusion of a
few acres" of indigenous national territory within the city "in no way interfered
with the rights or property of the Indians"); Shore v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 55
F.2d 696, 702 (D. Kan. 1931) (portion of bed of Arkansas river historically within
19981 INDIGENOUS NATIONS AND TRADE 287
condemnation proceeding taking indigenous national land2
and extensions of state jurisdiction. 0
territory of Osage Nation was beneath navigable waters and had become part of
state of Kansas upon Kansas' admission to Union); Anderson v. Brule County,
292 N.W. 429 (S.D. 1940) (1885 act of the territorial legislature extending the city
limits of Chamberlain to include a portion of the Great Sioux Reservation valid).
129. See United States v. Cattaraugus County, 71 F. Supp. 413 (W.D.N.Y.
1947) (upholding validity of New York condemnation proceeding whereby lands of
the Seneca Nation were acquired for state highway purposes).
130. See Red Hawk v. Joines, 278 P. 572 (Or. 1929) (state has jurisdiction over
replevin action arising on allotted land within the Umatilla Reservation); State Se-
curities, Inc. v. Anderson, 506 P.2d 786 at 789 (N.M. 1973) (state has jurisdiction
in cases between members of Indigenous Nations and nonindigenous nationals
involving contractual obligations incurred off the reservation; process may be
served on indigenous nationals while they are within the boundaries of the reser-
vation); Norvell v. Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co., 372 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.M. 1974)
(New Mexico's regulation of land subdivision, construction licensing and water did
not substantially interfere with the Pueblo of Tesuque where regulations were
applied to nonindigenous lessees' large commercial and residential development
built on Pueblo lands); People v. Snyder, 141 Misc. 2d 444 at 452 (Co. Ct. 1988)
(New York has criminal jurisdiction over operation of electronic gambling devices
located on the Cattaraugus Reservation since there was no applicable Seneca ordi-
nance prohibiting gambling at the time the offense occurred and application of
state law would result in "no infringement of the Seneca Nation's right to create
rules governing their internal and social relations"); Organized Village of Kake v.
Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962) (Alaska can validly apply prohibition on fish traps to
Organized Village of Kake's use of fish traps and the Angoon Community Associa-
tion); State v. McCoy, 387 P.2d 942 (Wash. 1963) (State has right to regulate off-
reservation fishing notwithstanding 1855 Treaty of Point Elliott guaranteeing
"right of taking fish at usual and accustomed grounds and stations"). But see Ter-
ritory v. Annette Island Packing Co., 6 Alaska 585, 624 (D. Alaska 1922)
(nonindigenous-owned salmon canning operation conducted under a lease from the
Secretary of the Interior for the benefit of the Metlakahtla Nation was federal
instrumentality and occupational license tax imposed by the territorial government
on cannery was unlawful); United States v. Minnesota, 95 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1938)
(condemnation of allotted lands within Grand Portage Reservation for state high-
way purposes not valid absent federal permission); Warren Trading Post v. Arizona
Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) (Federal regulation of Indian traders, includ-
ing their appointment and licensing by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, is
sufficiently comprehensive as to exclude Arizona's 2% gross proceeds tax on trad-
ing post); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)
(Arizona could not validly collect income taxes from individual members of the
Navajo Nation and state's argument that the rights of individual members of the
tribe were distinct from the interests of the tribe as a whole for state tax purpos-
es deemed unpersuasive); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136
(1980) (federal regulation of indigenous national timber harvesting pre-empts state
jurisdiction over it and Arizona motor carrier license tax and excise or use fuel
tax were improperly applied to nonindigenous-owned logging companies that hauled
lumber across state highways located within the Fort Apache Reservation); Yakima
Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 735 F. Supp. 735, 745-746 (D.C. Wash. 1985) (al-
though county has jurisdiction over nonindigenous-owned land located within the
288 BROOK. J. INTL L. [Vol. XXIV:1
The economic barriers to indigenous national participation
in global commerce are the residuum of an earlier system in
which the isolation of Indigenous Nations was extreme and
was, in many instances, enforced with military power.'' The
boundaries that enclosed Indigenous Nations within frequently
barren territories-boundaries that shrunk under the impact of
repeated coerced land cessions-set Indigenous Nations apart
from states as "enclaved peoples." As two commentators note:
The political and legal system of Native American reserva-
tions in the United States is an unusual structural arrange-
ment between enclaved peoples and the larger political state
that encapsulates them. The forms of "native administration"
that developed here and in other English colonies such as
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have in common almost
total displacement of an aboriginal population by massive
European migration, followed by the development of a system
of permanent political reserves and administered communi-
ties. This pattern is by no means a common, inevitable, or
self-explanatory outcome of cultural contact; nor was it even
in the era of colonialism. 32
While the boundaries surrounding indigenous national
territories fall short of a hermetic confinement today, 3 they
external boundaries of reservation, except to the extent such jurisdiction infringes
on indigenous national sovereignty or is preempted by federal law, indigenous
national interest in regulating land at issue outweighed county's minimal regulato-
ry interest and county's jurisdiction therefore preempted by federal law).
131. See FRANCIS PAuL PRUCHA, AmcAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRISIS 72-102
(1976) (detailing the historic policy debate over whether U.S. administration of
Indian affairs should be conducted by military or civilian departments of govern-
ment). See also Frederick E. Hoxie, Crow Leadership Amidst Reservation Oppres-
sion, in STATE AND RESERVATION 38 (George Pierre Castile & Robert L. Bee eds.,
1992) (observing that [e]ven after [some] Native Americans had received individu-
al titles to real estate previously occupied communally, federal agents continued to
incarcerate Indians for infractions of reservation rules and to enforce their 'civiliza-
tion program' with military power.").
132. George Pierre Castile & Robert L. Bee, Introduction, in STATE AND RESER-
VATION, supra note 131, at 1.
133. As learned sociologists have observed, interactions among people-and
among peoples-do not invariably stop and start at national boundaries. See, e.g.,
STANFORD M. LYMIAN, NATO AND GERMANY: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF SUPRA-
NATIONAL RELATIONS 203 (1995) (observing that "[nietworks of interaction need not
and often do not form themselves along the lines drawn to mark nation-state
borders on geopolitical maps" and that 'Isluch networks range from the personal
to the professional and indicate elements of a burgeoning international civil society
that transcends the boundaries and circumvents the defenses against interaction
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do demarcate political spaces characterized by biting and en-
during poverty. This enduring poverty continues to constitute a
barrier to indigenous national participation in world trade.
Moreover, inasmuch as economic opportunity for individual
members of Indigenous Nations outside of the reservations
remains dwarfed by racial discrimination,"M the mere possi-
bility of exit from these enclaves is a poor remedy for a history
of enforced isolation."5
B. Conclusion: The Feasibility of Relying on International
Law to Encourage Free Indigenous National Participation
in Commerce
The historic isolation of Indigenous Nations from interna-
tional trade is perpetuated by currently-existing municipal
legal barriers to indigenous commerce. This circumstance
makes it likely that the current legal framework will hinder
Indigenous Nations that wish to revitalize their economies.
One alternative is to rely on international law to guarantee
that Indigenous Nations will have an opportunity to partici-
pate substantially-and without undue state hindrance-in
international trade and global commerce. Present international
efforts to bolster the rights of Indigenous Peoples tend to stop
short of recognizing an indigenous national right to self-deter-
across state lines."); STANFORD M. LYMAN, CIVILZATION: CONTENTS, DISCONTENTS,
MALCONTENTS, AND OTHER ESSAYS IN SOCIAL THEORY 19 (1990) (discussing the use
of the term "civilization" by sociologists tmile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, to
describe the "often seen but rarely noticed fact that certain phenomena-including
tools, aesthetic styles, languages, and institutions-thrive beyond politically deter-
mined boundaries and . . . have a life that is 'supranational').
134. Stanford Lyman raises the possibility that "the racial and ethnic discrimi-
nations suffered by Asians, Hispanics, and Indians are vestiges of the system of
black slavery" and that these groups are properly the subject of remedies fash-
ioned by Congress to address such racial and ethnic discrimination. STANFORD M.
LYMAN, COLOR, CULTURE, CIVILIZATION: RACE AND MINORITY ISSUES IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY 332-33 (1994).
135. For example, when the Choctaw Nation ceded its eastern lands and mi-
grated west, some members of the nation chose to stay behind and become citizens
of the state of Mississippi. Departure from the main body of the tribe, however,
proved to be easier than full entry into the privileges and immunities of state citi-
zenship. As two noted authorities explain, "[tihose Indians who remained behind in
Mississippi ... fared poorly as state citizens in spite of a federal guarantee that
they could reserve a homestead of 640 acres and assimilate into southern society."
VINE DELORIA JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 7
(1983).
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minacy and instead focus exclusively on "non-economic" human
rights. This focus tends to leave the economic isolation of In-
digenous Nations largely unchallenged.
A more energetic approach to addressing the economic
isolation of Indigenous Nations would require at least some
recognition of the political autonomy of Indigenous Nations.
Robert H. Berry III
